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APOLLO EXPERI ENCE REPORT 
LUNAR MODULE LANDING GEAR SUBSYSTEM 
By Wi l l iam F. Rogers 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
SUMMARY 
The development of the lunar module landing gear subsystem through the Apollo 11 
lunar-landing mission is described in this report. 
which must satisfy the structural, mechanical, and landing -performance constraints of 
the vehicle, the landing gear evolved from a fixed landing gear with five inverted tripod- 
type legs to a four-legged deployable landing gear. 
Based on the design requirements, 
Both extensive analyses and full-scale and model tests were undertaken to verify 
the design adequacy. 
served as a primary tool in the development of the subsystem hardware and in the pre- 
diction of the lunar module touchdown-performance capability. A major portion of the 
analyses was devoted to determining the performance adequacy of the landing gear for 
toppling stability and energy absorption. Landing-performance testing was  used pr i  - 
marily to verify the analyses. The successful Apollo 11 lunar-landing mission provided 
the first opportunity for a complete flight test of the landing gear under both natural and 
induced environments. 
The techniques developed for the landing -performance analyses 
INTRODUCTION 
The landing of the lunar module (LM) on the surface of the moon is one of the more 
crucial events of the Apollo mission. During the critical seconds at touchdown, the LM 
landing system brings the vehicle to rest while preventing toppling, absorbing the 
landing-impact energy, and limiting loads induced into the LM structure. The landing- 
gear design is influenced significantly by the LM structural requirements, the LM con- 
t rol  system, the lunar -surface topographical and soil characteristics, and the available 
stowage space. The landing gear also must provide a stable launch platform for lift-off 
of the ascent stage from the lunar surface. 
The design and development of the LM landing gear subsystem hardware from the 
time of 'its conception through the Apollo 11 lunar-landing mission are presented. Also 
presented is the interaction of the landing gear with other LM subsystems. The specific 
design requirements for the landing -gear development are discussed, followed by the 
development history, a brief configuration description, a discussion of major problems, 
and a summary of flight test results. Detailed information about the LM landing per-  
formance, the hardware development and testing, and the landing -gear configuration is 
given in appendixes A, B, and C, respectively. 
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA 
The landing gear subsystem hardware design requirements may be divided into 
three general categories - structural, mechanical, and landing performance. 
turally, the landing gear must withstand the loads and conditions imposed by the induced 
and natural environments defined in the technical specification (ref. 1) and in the report  
entitled "Design Criteria and Environments - LM" (ref. 2). 
loads must not exceed the LM structural-design requirements. 
Struc - 
The landing-gear s t rut  
Mechanically, the landing gear must deploy properly and lock down while in lunar 
orbit. 
service module (CSM). In the stowed position, the landing gear must physically clear 
the Saturn IVB (S-IVB) stage and the spacecraft/LM adapter (SLA) during the CSM/LM 
ejection maneuver, and landing-gear deployment must be controlled from within the 
LM cabin, 
This is accomplished before the undocking of the LM from the command and 
The landing gear must provide sufficient energy -absorption capability and ade - 
quate vehicle -toppling stability for the range' of possible touchdown conditions and for 
the lunar -surface characteristics defined in the technical specification. On the lunar 
surface, the landing gear must prevent impact of the descent-stage base heat shield, 
fuel tanks, and plumbing with the lunar surface; however, the descent-engine skir t  may 
contact the lunar surface. For the purpose of ascent-stage lift-off, the landing gear 
must allow the vehicle to come to rest so  that the vehicle X-axis (fig. 1) does not ex- 
ceed a specified tilt angle from the local vertical. 
The landing gear must meet vehicle thermal-design requirements. Passive 
thermal control is used to maintain the landing-gear structural temperatures within the 
design range to ensure positive structural margins of safety and proper mechanical op- 
eration during deployment and landing. Included in this requirement is the necessity 
to control the temperature of the honeycomb -cartridge energy absorbers within speci - 
fied limits to preclude large variations in crush load levels. 
These items constitute the major design requirements and the general standards 
that were used in determining the adequacy of the landing-gear-subsystem design. 
criticality of the landing gear is apparent. Structural or mechanical failure during 
touchdown could result in loss of life, depending on the mode of failure and whether or  
not any attempted ascent -stage abort during landing proved successful. Failure to 
achieve proper touchdown conditions o r  failure to land in an area of specified lunar- 
surface topography could result in an unstable landing o r  in structural failure because 
of overstroking a strut. 
The 
The design criteria most significant to the landing gear were those associated 
with the touchdown performance; specifically, the lunar -surface conditions and the ve - 
hicle initial conditions at touchdown. At the time the development of the LM landing 
gear was initiated, no detailed information was available concerning the lunar -surface 
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Figure 1. - The LM configuration (contractor technical proposal). 
topography o r  soil characteristics; however, some preliminary data were available 
concerning vehicle touchdown conditions. 
sumed, for design purposes, to meet the Apollo Program schedule. 
A hypothetical lunar surface had to be as- 
The lunar -surface specifications (refs. 1 and 2) contained both topographical and 
soil -property definitions. 
of 6"  o r  less and an effective slope of 12" o r  less,  including the effects of depressions 
o r  protuberances (or both) and footpad penetration. 
within the landing-gear footprint, the vertical distance from the top of the highest pro- 
tuberance to the bottom of the lowest depression would be 24 inches o r  less. The soil 
bearing strength was  such that a static load of 1 .0  lb/in would result in a penetration 
of 4 inches o r  less, and a dynamic load of 12  lb/in would result in a penetration of 
24 inches or less. The coefficient of sliding friction of the lunar surface was assumed 
to range from 0.4 to 1.0; however, complete constraint of the footpads could also be 
assumed. Data obtained from the NASA Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter Programs and the 
first Apollo lunar landing verified the adequacy of the lunar-surface specification. The 
bearing -strength assumptions were somewhat conservative in that the Apollo 11 landing 
indicated a 2 to 3 psi/in. lower boundary of bearing strength in the landing area. Post- 
flight analysis indicated that a coefficient of sliding friction of 0.4 was a realistic value. 
Topographical features consisted of a mean surface slope 
The assumption was made that, 
2 
2 
Assumed initial conditions at touchdown (vehicle attitude, angular rates, and 
linear velocities) have varied during the course of the LM development. Initially, the 
touchdown velocities were specified as a lO-ft/sec maximum vertical velocity V and 
a 5 -ft/sec maximum horizontal velocity Vh. This envelope was subsequently reduced 
V 
3 
' 
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to a 4 -ft/sec maximum horizontal velocity, based on updated simulation data. Later, 
the envelope was  further reduced, as is discussed in the section entitled "Redesign 
of the 167-Inch-Tread-Radius Landing Gear. 'I  This final reduction resulted in an en- 
velope where, for Vv I 7 ft/sec, Vh = 4 ft/sec; and, for  7 ft/sec 5 Vv 5 IO ft/sec, 
40 - 5 V ft/sec. Further details of the lunar-surface description and initial con- 3 v  Vh = 3
ditions at touchdown are provided in appendix A. 
For the purpose of structural design, the ultimate safety factor for the landing 
The 1.35 safety gear was 1. 35, with an  ultimate safety factor of 1.50 on all fittings. 
factor was based on the landing gear being a load-limited device; that is, the honeycomb 
energy absorbers used in the landing gear crush at predictable load levels, thereby ab- 
solutely limiting the loads that can be induced into the landing gear. 
DEVELOPMENT HI STORY 
The general design requirements discussed in the previous section have applied 
to the LM landing system since the decision in 1962 to use the lunar orbit rendezvous 
technique to accomplish a manned lunar landing. The LM configuration proposed by 
the contractor (fig. 1) consisted of a five -legged, fixed, inverted-tripod-type landing 
gear attached to a cylindrical descent stage. The five-legged landing gear was the 
lightest arrangement and provided the largest  diameter base consistent with the space 
restrictions of the SLA without retraction. Configurations of four and six legs were 
also considered. 
the selected arrangement and provided only a small  increase in stabili& for the same 
diameter base. To provide the same stability as was available in the five-legged con- 
figuration, the four-legged landing gear required a larger  diameter and retraction for 
stowage in the SLA. 
The six-legged landing gear was approximately 40 pounds heavier than 
Soon after the LM contract was  awarded, the basic descent stage was  changed 
from a cylindrical structure to a cruciform-type structure that could accommodate a 
four -legged landing gear more readily. The inverted-tripod-type landing gear, which 
consisted of a primary s t rut  and two secondary s t ruts  joined near the footpad (fig. l), 
is typical of the early configurations that were considered for both the cylindrical- and 
cruciform -shaped descent stages. 
After selection of the four -legged landing gear, which required retraction for 
stowage because of the large landing -gear tread radius, many detailed inverted-tripod 
landing-gear leg designs were studied. Landing-gear tread radii ranged from 140 to 
240 inches, with the tread radius defined as the distance from the vehicle longitudinal 
axis to the center of the landing-gear footpad. 
The next major landing-gear design was the cantilever type in which the second- 
a ry  struts are attached to the primary strut  above the stroking portion (fig. 2). Stud- 
ies conducted on cantilever-type landing gears  with 160- to 180-inch tread radii resulted 
in the selection of a 167-inch-tread-radius landing gear as the final design, This se- 
lection was influenced significantly by the availability of stowage space. The major LM 
landing -gear configurations are summarized in table I. 
4 
s t r u t  
-- b , Deployed position 
I Stowed position 
Lunar-su rface- 
sensing probe 
Figure 2. - Stowed and deployed positions of the 
landing gear. 
TABLE I. - SIGNIFICANT LANDING-GEAR DESIGN CONCEPTS 
Configuration 
Tripod, 4 legs 
Tripod, 5 legs 
Tripod, 4 legs 
Tripod, 4 legs 
Cantilever, 4 legs 
Cantilever, 4 legs 
Cantilever, 4 legs 
Tread radius, 
in. 
120 
140 to 240 
200 
160 to 180 
167 
167 
Approximate 
date 
Aug. 1962 
Sept. 1962 
Nov. 1963 
Nov. 1963 
Nov. 1963 
Dec. 1964 
July 1965 
Remarks 
Apollo statement of work 
configuration 
Contractor technical proposal 
-- 
Lateral-retraction concept 
Improved weight and 
performance 
Optimum, based on perform- 
ance analysis 
Redesigned landing gear with 
reduced s t rut  loads and 
increased stroke capability 
5 
Design studies conducted on various landing-gear s t rut  arrangements show that 
the cantilever-type landing gear has several advantages over the inverted-tripod 
arrangement. The cantilever -type landing gear weighs less, primarily because the 
secondary s t ruts  are much shorter than those in the inverted-tripod design. 
ening of the secondary s t ru ts  and the simplification of the primary-strut-to -footpad 
attachment compensated for the increase in weight of the primary strut  that was neces- 
sitated by the high bending loads encountered in the cantilever-type design. Because of 
light weight and relatively short length, the cantilever -type -landing-gear secondary 
struts are primarily axially loaded members that bend as a result of lateral inertial 
loading only. Another advantage of the cantilever-type design is that the location of the 
secondary struts minimizes interference problems in the vicinity of the footpad. Land- 
ing analyses indicated that the cantilever -type landing gear provided greater toppling 
stability than an inverted-tripod landing gear of the same tread radius, primarily be- 
cause the cantilever-type landing gear provided a lower, and thus a more favorable, 
center -of -gravity (c. g. ) location. 
The short- 
During the course of the landing-gear development, extensive testing was under- 
During the development phases, testing was performed 
taken to investigate specific a reas  of concern, such as primary-strut bearings and 
honeycomb energy absorbers. 
for all significant ground and flight environments. Certification testing, especially 
deployment tes ts  in a thermal-vacuum environment and drop tes ts  at design landing 
conditions, was accomplished, in accordance with Apollo Program test philosophy, on 
as complete a subsystem assembly as possible. 
were used for the majority of the certification program. 
verification testing was performed at both component and assembly levels. Model tes ts  
were conducted in support of the landing-performance analysis. 
Thus, landing-gear-assembly tes ts  
Development and design- 
Landing dynamics w a s  a major concern in the LM development. The LM 
touchdown -performance characteristics had to be compatible with a broadly defined 
lunar surface and with the LM control-system characteristics, Furthermore, the LM 
had to be capable of landing under conditions of zero visibility. Because of the diffi- 
culty in conducting meaningful and comprehensive full -scale landing -performance tests 
in the earth -gravity environment, extensive landing -dynamics analyses, using digital - 
computer simulations, were performed to evaluate the landing gear for both toppling 
stability and energy -absorption capability, The analyses were conducted concurrently 
with much of the structural and mechanical testing previously discussed. Results of 
both the development testing and the performance analyses were used to determine an 
optimum landing gear based on the design requirements. Analysis of the landing-gear 
performance also constituted a major portion of the flight certification. The landing 
performance and the hardware development and certification testing are discussed in 
detail in appendixes A and B, respectively. 
CONFIGURATION DESCRIPTION 
A sketch of the LM mounted in the SLA with the landing gear in the stowed posi- 
tion is shown in figure 3. 
Apollo spacecraft is in lunar orbit. Deployment occurs during LM systems activation 
before powered descent to the lunar surface. 
167.57 inches from the vehicle X-axis. A landing-gear leg assembly in both the stowed 
The landing gear remains in the stowed position until the 
The center of each LM footpad is 
6 
and the deployed positions is shown in figure 2, and the major landing-gear components 
a r e  shown in figure 4. An overall view of the final LM configuration with the landing 
gear deployed is shown in figure 5. 
Each of the four separate landing-gear leg assemblies has energy -absorption 
capability in the single primary and two secondary struts. The deployment t russ  serves  
as a structural-mechanical assembly between the landing-gear struts and the descent- 
stage structure. Each landing-gear leg is retained in the stowed position by a titanium 
strap. When a pyrotechnic uplock device is fired, the titanium strap that is attached to 
the primary s t rut  and the descent stage is severed, allowing the landing gear to be de- 
ployed and locked by mechanisms located on each side of the landing-gear leg assembly, 
The primary s t rut  (fig. 6) on each landing-gear leg assembly consists of a lower 
iMer cylinder that fits into an upper outer cylinder to provide compression stroking 
(fig. 7) at touchdown. The strut  is attached 
at the upper end (by a universal fitting) to 
t X  
-X  
Figure 3.- The LM supported in the SLA. 
1 1  
Deployment 
and downlock I /  
Secondary s t ru t  
1 u n a r  surface- 
Figure 4. - The LM landing gear. 
7 
I n n e r  cyl inder cyl inder io n 
Figure 5. - Overall view of the LM with 
the landing gear deployed. 
the LM descent-stage outrigger assembly. 
A footpad is attached to the lower end of 
the inner cylinder by a ball-joint fitting. 
The footpad, which is approximately 3 feet 
in diameter, is designed to support the 
4500-lb 
honeycomb 
9500- Ib 
honeycomb 
carlridge carlridge 
L tower bearing 
Figure 6. - Landing-gear primary strut. 
0 10 20 
~- 
I 
I 
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1 1 c 2  I 
30 40 
Compression stroke. i n .  
Figure 7. - Primary-strut compression 
load as a function of compression 
2 stroke. LM on a 1.0 -lb/in -bearing -strength sur  - 
face and to maintain functional capability 
after having impacted rocks o r  ledges dur- 
ing  ouchd down. The footpad is constructed 
of aluminum honeycomb bonded to machined 
aluminum face sheets. Attached to all 
footpads except the one on the forward 
landing gear (the plus-Z axis) is a 5.6-foot 
probe that is designed to sense lunar- 
surface proximity and to signal the LM 
pilot so  that he can initiate descent-engine 
ward landing gear was deleted because of 
a concern that the failed probe could inter- 
fere with crewmen descending the LM 
ladder , 
shutdown. The probe located on the for- cartridge 
lcompressionl 
The secondary s t ruts  (fig. 8) also Figure 8. - Landing-gear 
have an inner and an outer cylinder. The secondary strut. 
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outer cylinder is connected to the primary s t rut  by a ball-and-socket attachment, and 
the inner cylinder is attached to the deployment-truss assembly by a universal fitting. 
The secondary struts are capable of both tension and compression stroking (fig. 9). A 
detailed description of the flight-hardware components is contained in appendix C. 
: u 6o00r 4500 Ib 
.- i m 0 - i  E CL zoo0 
E 
V 
0 - 4  -8 - 12 
Compression stroke. in. 
I 
-16  * 
5000 Ib e 6000 
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0 4 8 12 16 20 
I 
 
Tension stroke, in. 
(a) Compression load as a function (b) Tension load as a function 
of compression stroke. of tension stroke. 
Figure 9. - Secondary -strut compression and tension loads. 
MAJOR PROBLEMS 
The major problems encountered during development of the landing-gear - 
subsystem hardware a r e  discussed in this section. Some of these problems were solved 
by changes in the design criteria, and other problems were solved by hardware redesign. 
A summary of the landing-gear weight history and a brief discussion of the history of 
landing -gear failures during the Apollo Program a r e  presented also. 
Redesign of t h e  167- I nch-Tread-Radius Landing Gear 
Early in 1965, a structural analysis of the landing gear and the primary LM 
structure revealed that the design load/stroke characteristics of the landing gear ex- 
ceeded the vehicle structural capability. Also, vehicle -stability and strut-stroking r e  - 
quirements were not being achieved. These problems were identified as a result of 
increased vehicle weight, as well as a more refined analysis. To resolve the incom- 
patibility, redesign of the LM structure o r  landing gear was necessary to reduce the 
loads imposed on the structure. A review of trade-off studies, showed the latter ap- 
proach to be more desirable. An intensive effort was initiated to establish a landing- 
gear design with suitable load/stroke characteristics and to reduce the existing 
touchdown-velocity design envelope. 
necessitated a reevaluation of the touchdown-parameter statistical distributions asso - 
ciated with both manual and automatic landing techniques (ref. 3). 
made ;to consider an envelope acceptable if it could be demonstrated that the probability 
of the touchdown velocities falling within the envelope would exceed 0.9974 (the 3a prob- 
ability, for a single, normally distributed random variable). Included in the study was 
an analysis to determine a lunar -surface -sensing -probe length that would ensure a 
high probability of engine -off landings within the touchdown-velocity design envelope. 
The reassessment of the touchdown envelope 
The decision was 
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As a result of the studies, the landing gear was redesigned to the loadjstroke 
levels shown in figures 7 and 9. 
ing gear based on the maximum touchdown-velocity envelope assumed for the landing 
gear design (fig. 10). The actual limit boundaries for primary- and secondary-strut 
stroking and the actual stability boundary are also shown in figure 10. 
orientation and surface conditions for critical stability and stroking are shown in fig- 
u re  11. 
which was based on piloted simulations. Besides the velocity -envelope revision, the 
attitude and attitude-rate criteria were  revised, based on the simulation data. 
change is an example of a reasonable c r i -  
terion change, based on updated informa - 
tion, that alleviated a design problem. 
This design was  designated the 167-inch (10-7-4) land- 
The vehicle 
The reduced envelope was still well outside the 30 touchdown-velocity envelope, 
This 
Secondary-strut 
compression stroke Stability 
Secondary -st r u t  
compression-stroke l2 r
167-in. 110-7-4) 
4 0 4 
Landing on an 
uph i l l  slope downhil l  slope 
Horizontal velocity. ftlsec 
Landing on a 
12 in. 3- 
12" 
4- +- 7- 12" t -
A l l  landing gears constrained: 
maximum landing weight 
Al l  landing gear, constrained: 
min imum landing weight 
Secondary-strut Pr imary-s t ru t  
tension stroke compression stroke 
One o r  two 24-in. depressions, ' A l l  landing gears constrains 
c = 0.4 for a l l  landing gears: 
maximum landing weight 
maxlmum landing weight 
Figure 10. - Final-landing-gear Figure 11. - Critical landing 
landing performance. conditions. 
Statist ical Landing Performance 
A major change in the treatment of the landing-performance-problem input param- 
e t e r s  occurred as a result of the descent-engine thrust-decay time history. 
purposes, a thrust-decay time of approximately 0.5 second was used. A thrust decay 
of several seconds, which was  an extremely destabilizing influence at touchdown, was  
evident in the actual descent-engine firing data. For worst-case combinations of pa- 
rameters,  the stability boundary lies well within both the design velocity envelope and 
the 30 velocity envelope that had been derived from simulation data. Attempts to reduce 
the engine thrust-decay time by hardware changes were unsuccessful. 
For design 
Another statistical analysis was performed to determine realistically the impact 
of the revised thrust-decay time. At the time this analysis was  performed, detailed 
Lunar Orbiter photographic data of the lunar surface were available. To make the 
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analysis as  realistic as possible, a statistical description of the lunar surface, which 
consisted of general surface slopes and surface protuberances and depressions, w a s  
derived from Lunar Orbiter photography. Statistical descriptions of potential Apollo 
landing sites were formulated and, based on general surface slope, the most severe 
site was  chosen for the analysis. This analysis, which was used to certify the adequacy 
of the LM landing performance, constituted a criterion change because of the method of 
combining design parameters. 
Another factor that influenced the landing -performance analysis was the desire of 
the Apollo 11 (LM-5) crewmen to have the option of thrusting the descent engine until 
the footpads had touched down, rather than initiating engine shutdown following lunar- 
surface -probe contact. This option resulted in additional analysis, and statistical re - 
sults were obtained for both the "probe" mode and the ??pad" mode type of LM landing, 
The probe mode is the primary pro- 
cedure for LM touchdown and consists of 
descent-engine shutdown initiation follow - 
ing probe contact but before footpad con- 
tact. The pad mode is considered a 
backup landing mode in which engine thrust 
is terminated following footpad contact. 
Touchdown performance was  predicted for 
both landing procedures. The touchdown- 
velocity ellipse for each mode and perti- 
nent information on other initial conditions 
at touchdown a r e  shown in figure 12. 
data used in the analysis are compared 
with the Apollo 11 (LM-5) results, which 
are discussed in more detail in the sec-  
tion entitled "Apollo 11 Flight-Test Re- 
sults. " 
The 
The estimated probability factor for 
achieving a stable configuration using the 
probe mode is 0.967. If slopes greater 
than 12" a r e  removed arbitrarily from the 
calculations, the probability factor is in- 
creased to 0.998. For the pad mode, the 
probability of a stable landing anvwhere 
Touchdown-velocity 
envelope 
-1.8 ftlsec 
-2.2 ft fsec 
io. 1 ftlsec 
.LM-5 (pad model 
Pilot reaction time = 
1.1 sec 
Vehic le  altitudes at touchdown, deg 
3 0  l imi ts  Actual -
Pitch 5.69 0.8 
Roll  5.72 2.6 
Yaw Random .- 
Vehicle angular  rates at touchdown. deglsec 
3u l imits - Actual 
P i tch 
Roll 
Yaw 
6.0 0.6 
6.0 1.6 
1.5 .6 
Figure 12. - Apollo 11 attitude and 
motion touchdown conditions. 
in the landing ellipse is 0.986. if stroking is considered, the probability of using less 
than the available stroke for a landing in either mode is 0.999. 
Although these probabilities are based on a Monte Carlo statistical analysis, con- 
siderable conservatism is involved, as previously noted. The stability analysis is 
based entirely on constrained-footpad-type landings. Footpad sliding is not considered 
in calculating toppling stability. For the calculations of stroking, the energy -absorption 
characteristics of the lunar soil are not considered. Furthermore, the statistical sur- 
face description is based on the Apollo site that has the most severe topographic relief 
of the Apollo landing sites originally considered. No crew selectivity was assumed to 
be involved in choosing the touchdown point within the landing site. 
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Thermal Insulation 
Landing-gear thermal-insulation design is based on several  requirements, 
Landing-gear temperatures must be maintained at or  below design levels to ensure pos- 
itive structural margins of safety and proper mechanical operation during deployment 
and landing. 
l imits is necessary to ensure that the crush loads will be within proper levels. 
Temperature control of the honeycomb energy absorbers within specified 
Based on these requirements, an estimated 8.0 pounds of thermal paint was al- 
lotted to landing-gear thermal control early in the development program. The weight 
history of the landing-gear thermal insulation is shown in table II. As thermal testing 
and analysis progressed, i t  became apparent that 8.0 pounds of thermal paint were 
totally inadequate for landing -gear thermal protection. Additional insulation had to be 
provided because of the effects of LM reaction control system (RCS) plume impingement, 
The impingement from the RCS plume adversely affected the structural temperatures 
and the temperature of the honeycomb energy absorbers in the primary and secondary 
struts. Landing-performance analysis, fo r  which the energy -absorber load levels 
that are temperature dependent were used, showed considerable degradation in landing- 
gear performance for worst -case combinations of honeycomb temperatures and landing 
conditions. The outcome of this investigation was  the addition of thermal-insulation 
blankets to the main structural members of the landing gear. The thermal-insulation 
weight (table II) was increased to 29.4 pounds for the Ap0110 9 LM (LM-3) and Apollo 10 
LM (LM-4), which were the first two LM flight art icles to have landing gears. 
TABLE II. - LANDING-GEAR THERMAL-INSULATION WEIGHT HISTORY 
Approximate 
date 
Nov. 1964 
Mar. 1967 
Feb. 1969 
May 1969 
June 1969 
.Weight, 
lb 
8 
“22 
29.4 
29.4 
68.4 
-- ~~ - . .- 
Remarks 
Thermal-paint estimate; no thermal blankets o r  
plume shielding defined 
RCS plume -impingement requirement 
Apollo 9 mission, actual 
Apollo 10 mission, actual 
Apollo 11 mission, actual; weight change caused 
by thrust until footpad contact and increased 
heating rates  on landing gear 
a Approximately. 
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Another significant thermal-design problem related to the landing gear was the 
effect of descent-engine-plume heating. A few months before the flight of Apollo 11, 
data from scale-model shock-tube tests indicated that heating rates on the landing gear 
were much higher than previously had been considered for design. 
sulted in an extensive effort to design additional thermal insulation for the landing gear 
and to perform structural and mechanical tests on the affected hardware. 
This increase re- 
At approximately the time the problem of excessive heating rates was identified, 
the LM flight crew expressed a desire to have the option of using either the pad mode 
o r  the probe mode. Inclusion of the pad mode resulted in even higher predicted heating 
rates for the landing gear. Consequently, the Apollo 11 landing-gear thermal-insulation 
weight was increased 39 pounds over that of Apollo 10. A more refined analysis allowed 
reduction of the landing-gear -insulation weight on subsequent vehicles. 
Weight Sum ma ry 
Summaries of the LM and the LM landing-gear-subsystem weight histories are 
presented in figure 1'3. The final landing-gear weight w a s  considerably higher than 
originally predicted. One reason for the significant increase was the decision to use 
a deployable four -legged landing gear instead of the proposed fixed five -1eggedarrange- 
ment. As the total LM weight w a s  increased, the landing -gear weight was  also increased. 
- L  I L 1 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
10 I 
1962 
Calendar year 
(a) The LM touchdown weight history. 
1 I 
1969 1970 
Figure 13. - The LM weight history. 
13 
LM weight- 
-1 txxd$on Apollo 9 Apollo 10 
- - 4 0 0  
proposal 
-1 - L 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
1 -~ 
1970 
300 
Calendar year 
(b) The LM landing-gear weight history. 
Figure 13. - Concluded. 
During the latter half of 1965 and the f i rs t  half of 1966, a concerted effort was 
made to decrease the overall LM weight. A landing-gear weight decrease of approxi- 
mately 75 pounds was accomplished primarily in two ways. 
to decrease structural loads (discussed in appendix A) also decreased landing -gear 
The landing-gear redesign 
loads, which resulted in a substantial 
weight savings. Second, approximately 
40 pounds were saved throughgeneral re- 
design efforts, such as replacing machined 
s t ruts  having riveted end fittings with struts 
having integral fittings, No further weight 
changes were made until the requirements 
for additional thermal insulation on the 
Apollo 11 LM caused a significant increase. 
The thermal -insulation design w a s  refined 
following the Apollo 11 mission to a final 
landing-gear weight of approximately 
456 pounds, o r  less  than 3 percent of the 
vehicle landing weight. A summary of 
the Apollo 11 landing-gear major- 
component weights is given in table III. 
TABLE Ill. - APOLLO 11 LANDING-GEAR-COMPONENT 
WEIGHT SUMMARY 
Component 
Primary strutsa 
Secondary strutsa 
Footpads 
Deployment t russ  and deployment mechanisms 
Lunar-surface -sensing probes 
Thermal insulation 
Total 
Weight, 
lb 
211.3 
68. 8 
44.9 
80.4  
6. I 
68.4  
486.5 
-
aTota.l honeycomb-energy-absorber weight in a l l  struts  i s  
approximately 61 bounds. 
Failure History 
Although landing-gear hardware failures were not a major problem, a discussion 
of the types of failures, the causes, and the corrective actions is pertinent. A history 
of the landing-gear failures and where they occurred is given in table IV. Failures of 
the lunar -surface -sensing-probe switch subassembly a r e  listed separately because this 
was the most troublesome component during the development. 
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TABLE IV. - LANDING-GEAR FAILURE HISTORY 
~ 
- .  I 1966 I 1967 1 1968 
j ij213 j.+ 12131411j21i14 
I I 
1969 
1 2 1 3 j 4  
. . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . . . . . .  
. .  
Vendor 5 
Contractor facility 
Launch site 
- - .~ ~ - .  .~
5 3 1  
1 
A ’ 1 ’  - .. 
I Landing -gear assembly I 
L ~ ~ - ~ -. .~ ~- . . .  _ -__  
The failures listed in table IV occurred during certification testing and acceptance 
and ground-checkout testing. The probe-switch failures were  about evenly divided be - 
tween certification and acceptance tests. After a reed switch inside the switch subas- 
sembly had been identified as a. weak component, fabrication techniques for the switch 
assembly were improved,. and the failure rate decreased significantly. During preflight 
checkout, the probe-switch mechanism w a s  also subject to inadvertent mechanical actu- 
ation into the latched position. 
performed shortly before launch. A latch in the switch electrical circuitry (designed to 
ensure that the lunar-contact lights in the cabin remain illuminated following probe con- 
tact), rather than the mechanical latch, would have eliminated this problem. 
For this reason, a final visual check of the switches.is 
- .  -. 
Vendor . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Contractor facility . . . . .  
Launch site . . . . . . . . .  I - -~ ... . -  
Included in the landing -gear -assembly failures a r e  two landing -gear deployment 
failures, one during certification and the other during vehicle checkout. No landing - 
gear failures of any type, structural, mechanical, thermal, o r  touchdown performance, 
have occurred during flight. 
flight hardware a r e  listed in appendix B, with the rationale for the adequacy of the flight 
hardware. Also listed in appendix B a r e  all certification-level tests performed during 
the course of the landing -gear development. 
Differences between the certified configuration and the 
~ . . - .. ~. 
1 
. .  . . .  
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APOLLO 11 FLIGHT-TEST RESULTS 
The initial landing of an LM on the lunar surface constituted the first complete 
flight test of the landing-gear hardware. Landing-gear deployment in space had been 
demonstrated on two previous manned LM flights, Apollo 9 and 10. Before the Apollo 11 
mission, LM landing performance and landing-gear functional operation had been dem - 
onstrated by analysis and by extensive ground tests. During these tests, the landing 
gear was exposed to all significant flight environments, including vehicle drop tes ts  un- 
der simulated lunar-gravity conditions. 
The touchdown of the Apollo 11 LM on the lunar surface occurred at very low 
vertical and horizontal velocities. 
of the LM resting on the lunar surface is shown in figure 14, and a closeup view of the 
minus-Z footpad is shown in figure 15. 
that the landing occurred on a relatively flat, smooth surface and that negligible landing- 
gear stroking occurred. 
Landing occurred in the pad mode. An overall view 
From these photographs, it was determined 
Figure 14. - Apollo 11 LM (LM-5) 
on the lunar surface. 
Figure 15. - Apollo 11 LM (LM-5) 
minus -Z (aft) footpad. 
The landing occurred with negligible plus-Z velocity, a minus-Y velocity of ap- 
proximately 2 . 1  ft/sec, and a minus-X velocity of approximately 1 . 7  ft/sec. Vehicle 
angular-rate transients (fig. 16) indicate that the right- and forward-landing-gear legs 
touched almost simultaneously, which resulted in a roll-left and pitch-up vehicle mo - 
tion. The touchdown conditions, which were obtained from attitude-rate data and 
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Figure 16. - Apollo 11 (LM-5) attitudes and attitude rates at touchdown. 
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Figure 16. - Concluded. 
integration of accelerometer data, were verified qualitatively by the positions of the 
lunar-surface-sensing probes and by lunar -soil buildup around the footpads. 
boom in figure 14 is nearly vertical on the inboard side of the minus-Y footpad, which 
indicates a component of velocity in the minus-Y direction. Soil is apparently built up 
on the outboard side of the pad, which indicates a lateral  velocity in that direction. The 
probe position and the lunar-soil disturbance produced by the minus-Z landing-gear as- 
sembly (fig. 16(a)) indicate a lateral velocity in the minus-Y direction. The soil dis- 
turbance on the minus-Y side of the minus-Z footpad is shown in greater detail in 
figure 15. The soil disturbance around the plus-Y landing-gear assembly indicates a 
minus-Y velocity of this leg at touchdown because the probe on the plus-Y leg was on 
the outboard side and soil was piled inboard of the pad. 
The probe 
The crewmen reported no sensation of toppling instability during touchdown. A 
postflight simulation of the landing dynamics indicated a maximum footpad penetration 
of 0.5 to 1. 5 inches and a footpad slide distance of 18 to 22 inches. Results of postflight- 
simulation predictions of s t rut  stroking have been compared with estimates derived 
from the landing-gear photographs, Primary -strut stroking was estimated by compar - 
ing photographs of the LM after touchdown with photographs of the landing gear before 
the flight. The conclusion was that little o r  no stroking of the primary struts occurred. 
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Because the inner cylinder of the secondary struts has a rigid Inconel thermal 
shield, stroking could be estimated by scaling the dimensions of the s t ruts  in the photo- 
graphs. At least a 0.25-inch uncertainty existed in this measurement because of the 
manner in which the thermal shield is attached to the inner cylinder. The stroking was 
estimated by scaling the distance from the end of the Inconel thermal cuff to the edge of 
the outer-cylinder end cap near the primary-strut juncture. A scale factor was ob- 
tained by measuring the diameter of the strut  end cap in the photograph. Where neces- 
sary, the measurements were corrected for the strut  axis not being normal to the 
camera view. The stroke estimates are listed in table V. Where there was more than 
one photograph of a s t rut  from which the stroke could be estimated, a comparison is 
shown, 
be accurate within 1.0 inch. Secondary-strut tension stroking was as much as 4 inches. 
Even though the primary s t rut  is designed for a maximum 32-inch stroke, no primary- 
s t rut  stroking was recorded on Apollo 11. 
The strokes that were derived by analysis of the photographs a r e  estimated to 
TABLE V. - APOLLO 11 (LM-5) STRUT-STROKE ESTIMATES 
Strut 
Plus-Z, primary 
Plus-Z, right 
Plus-Z, left 
Minus-Z, primary 
Minus-Z, right 
Minus-Z, left 
Plus -Y, primary 
Plus-Y, right 
Plus-Y, left 
Minus -Y, primary 
Minus -Y, right 
Minus -Y, left 
a Tension. 
Average photographic 
estimate, in. 
0 
-- 
4.0 
0 
a 
“2.5 
4.5 
0 
“2.8 
a . 5  
0 
“3.2 
0 
a 
Simulation 
estimate, in. 
0 
. 2  
‘3.6 
0 
3.2 
. 2  a 
0 
a 
“3.4 
1 .0  
0 
1.4 
1.4 
a 
a 
a 
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The engine-skirt clearance values 
measured from the photographs and the 
values predicted from postflight simula- 
tions were found to be in excellent agree- 
ment, The distance between the lunar 
surface and the engine-nozzle exit is es- 
timated from the photographs to be 
13. 5 inches. Based on landing simula- 
tions, a clearance of 13.8 inches was 
predicted. The skir t  clearance for an 
LM resting on a flat surface with no s t ruts  
stroked is 19 inches. 
ground clearance is further evidence to 
support the stroking analysis, which in- 
dicated a small amount of secondary- 
s t rut  tension stroking that resulted in 
lowering the vehicle. 
appeared to be resting on a relatively 
flat surface. The engine skirt  is shown 
in figure 17, and a slight amount of soil 
erosion caused by the engine exhaust is 
visible beneath the skirt. 
The decreased 
The Apollo 11 LM 
Figure 17. - Apollo 11 (LM-5) 
descent-engine skirt. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Development of the lunar module landing-gear hardware started in mid-1962 and 
continued until mid-1969, when the first manned lunar landing occurred. During this 
period, development problems were encountered and successfully solved. At no time 
did the availability of landing-gear hardware jeopardize the Apollo Program schedule. 
One of the worthwhile outgrowths of the landing-gear program has been the de- 
The lunar module landing - velopment of techniques of landing -performance analysis. 
dynamics analytical computer program has been used as a prime tool in the development 
of the subsystem hardware and in the prediction of the lunar module touchdown per- 
formance. Landing-performance testing, which was  extremely complex and expensive, 
was used primarily to verify the analysis. 
landing -performance adequacy was based solely on analysis. The computer program 
developed for the lunar module landing analyses can be adapted readily for future 
manned and unmanned spacecraft landing-analysis studies. 
Final certification of the lunar module 
A review of the hardware indicates that the lunar -surface -sensing-probe switch, 
although adequate, w a s  troublesome. A latching mechanism in the electrical circuitry, 
rather than the mechanical latch that was  used, could have prevented some of the prob- 
lems encountered. 
A brief summary of the overall landing-gear performance may be stated as follows. 
1. Structural: All components and mechanisms have been test demonstrated or  
determined by analysis to equal o r  exceed the design requirements. .', 
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2. Mechanical: All mechanisms have been functionally test demonstrated to be 
adequate under lunar -mission environments. 
3. Landing performance: For the Apollo landing sites, the energy-absorption 
and toppling-stability capabilities are adequate. The probability of never attaining max- 
imum strut  stroking is greater than 0.999, and the probability of attaining a stable land- 
ing on a slope of 12" or  less is 0.998. 
Manned Spacecraft C enter 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, January 6, 1972 
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APPENDIX A 
LAND I NG PERFORMANCE OF THE L M  
Landing dynamics was a major concern during the development of the LM. The 
LM touchdown-performance characteristics must be compatible with both a broadly de - 
fined lunar surface and the LM control-system characteristics. Furthermore, the LM 
must be capable of landing under conditions of zero visibility. 
Because of the difficulty in conducting meaningful and comprehensive full -scale 
landing -performance tests in the earth -gravity environment, an extensive landing- 
dynamics analysis, in which digital -computer simulations were used, was the primary 
tool for proving the adequacy of the landing gear for both toppling stability and landing- 
gear energy -absorption capability, 
much of the structural and mechanical testing. Results of both the development testing 
and the performance analysis were used to develop an optimum landing gear that ful- 
filled the design requirements. Analysis of the landing-gear performance also consti- 
tuted a major portion of the flightworthiness certification. 
This analysis was conducted concurrently with 
Landing-performance tests were limited to 1/6 -scale-model tests and to planar - 
type full -scale landing-performance tests in a simulated lunar -gravity environment at 
the NASA Langley Research Center (LRC). Despite the relatively few landing-dynamics 
tes ts  conducted, a high degree of confidence in the predictions exists, based on the 
analysis. Independent analyses performed by 'the prime contractor and by NASA were 
correlated with each other and with the 1/6-scale and full-scale test data available. 
analysis/test correlation performed to verify the mathematical model is shown in 
figure A-1. 
The 
This appendix contains a detailed 
discussion of the LM landing-dynamics 
analysis and discussions of the lunar sur -  
face and the touchdown conditions, two ex- 
tremely important aspects of the analysis. 
Details of the model tests used to verify 
the analysis are discussed, and, finally, 
the LM touchdown-performance history and 
Test Analysis 
Stability and energy- 
Pr ime contractor 
- single-landing- Stroke present capability are discussed. 
LAND I NG-DY N A M l  CS ANALY S I S 
For the purpose of studying various 
landing -gear designs, a simplified planar - 
type landing-dynamics analysis was used; 
however, for a detailed analysis and eval- 
uation of landing-gear mechanisms and for 
Prime contractor and MSC analyses accurately predlct 
t he  t M  touchdown performance 
Figure A-1. - Validation of touchdown- 
analysis mathematical model. 
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providing design information for landing-load determinations and landing -gear - 
performance predictions, a three -dimensional landing-dynamics computer program 
was required. The following description of the LM landing-dynamics computer pro- 
gram is typical of the analyses used for landing studies. Detailed descriptions of the 
prime contractor analysis may be found in references A-1 and A-2, and a description 
of the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center analysis is given in reference A-3. 
Two basic requirements of the analysis were that it must realistically model the 
geometry and loading of the individual landing-gear members and that it must be capa- 
ble of accommodating a wide variety of lunar -surface conditions. 
studies, the LM, except for the landing gear, is considered to be a rigid body. An un- 
sprung mass represents the mass of the footpad and the primary strut. 
and secondary struts stroke axially and absorb energy according to the load,/stroke 
curves shown in figures 7 and 9. 
the purpose of determining the landing-gear geometry that results from stroking. 
Strut elasticity is introduced to the extent that it affects the overall vehicle motion. 
For landing -dynamics 
The primary 
The struts a r e  considered to be rigid in flexure for 
The energy absorption that results when a strut  is stroked axially is incorpo- 
rated in the model by assuming an elastic -plastic load/stroke characteristic. Energy, 
which is represented by the elastic portion of the curve, is released back into the sys- 
tem because of the axial elasticity of the strut. 
loads caused by transverse inertia a r e  assumed to be negligible; therefore, the second- 
a ry  struts a r e  only loaded axially. 
primary-strut bearing loads that must be accounted for  in the stroking analysis. 
load/stroke curve for each s t rut  may vary because of manufacturing tolerances, strut-  
stroking velocity, and honeycomb temperatures. For this reason, the analysis enables 
different honeycomb characteristics to be assigned to each strut. 
For the secondary struts,  bending 
The secondary-strut side loads cause sizable 
The 
The lunar surface at the touchdown point may have a general slope as well as 
various combinations of protuberances and depressions. 
acteristics, a footpad may be subjected to sliding-friction forces o r  to full constraint. 
Surface forces normal to the 'footpad a r e  assumed to be elastic-plastic. In addition, 
footpad loads caused by lateral  crushing are represented for  cases in which the footpad 
slides into a rigid obstacle. 
a single landing simulation. 
Because of the surface char - 
Combinations of footpad conditions can be represented in 
Other significant effects are included in the analysis. Control moments caused 
Because it is possible for the descent-engine noz- by RCS thrusting may be included. 
zle extension to impact the lunar surface, the load/stroke characteristics of the crush- 
able nozzle are included. Nozzle energy -absorption characteristics are based on tests 
of full-scale engine skirts. In addition to the descent-engine thrust, considerable 
forces may be exerted by the interaction of the descent-engine exhaust plume with the 
lunar surface, which causes surface-effect forces on the base of the vehicle. Signifi- 
cant engine thrust may occur with the nozzle close to the lunar surface because of the 
long thrust-decay time or because the pilot may choose to touch down with the engine 
on. A landing on top of a large protuberance o r  mound would place the nozzle close to 
the surface. With the nozzle thrusting close to the surface, a thrust-amplification ef- 
fect occurs. This effect has  a sizable influence on the LM toppling-stability character- 
istics and is accounted for in the analysis. 
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The vehicle c. g. has six degrees of freedom, three translational and three ro- 
tational. In addition, each footpad has three translational degrees of freedom. A total 
of 18 nonlinear, second-order, simultaneous differential equations of motion must be 
integrated to describe the vehicle dynamics. Results of a landing simulation include 
time histories of the rigid-body vehicle positions, velocities, and accelerations. In ad- 
dition, footpad motion, s t rut  loads, and s t rut  strokes a r e  obtained. The toppling sta- 
bility of the vehicle is also monitored, The vehicle is assumed to be stable neutrally 
if the vehicle tips to a point at which the vehicle c. g. coincides with the vertical plane 
that passes through the center of any two adjacent footpads. 
ity and the distance between the vehicle mass  center and the vertical plane are meas- 
ures  of the vehicle stability. If the vehicle stability and s t rut  strokes a r e  known, 
landing -gear performance evaluations can be made. 
The vehicle tipping veloc- 
During the early stages of the landing-gear analysis, it was  discovered that cer -  
qtain types of landings tend to be critical with respect to the vehicle stability o r  
the stroking of a particular strut. Although these particular landings could not be 
judged to be worst-case landings, they were the worst cases found and were considered 
to be good indicators of the adequacy of the particular landing-gear configuration being 
studied. These landing cases were called control runs and were used extensively for 
evaluation of the landing-gear designs. As analysis work continued, a more realistic 
look at landing performance was desired, which resulted in several statistical studies. 
The basic analysis for the statistical studies was the same as that used for the dis- 
crete analyses. Statistical representations of the lunar surface, spacecraft initial con- 
ditions at touchdown, and pertinent parameters (such as descent-engine thrust-decay 
time histories) were used in the statistical analyses. 
LUNAR-SURFACE DESCRI PTION 
To design an LM landing system, the surface on which the LM is to touch down 
must be defined. At the time the contract to produce a lunar-landing vehicle was 
awarded, only meager information was available concerning the lunar -surface top0 - 
graphical features and soil characteristics. Therefore, a surface had to be assumed 
that not only was reasonable but also was broad enough to accommodate a wide range of 
actual landing sites. A specification of the lunar surface was  formulated, and, based 
on this specification, the landing gear was  designed and manufactured. 
The original lunar-surface description (refs. 1 and 2) consisted of the topograph- 
ical and soil-property features defined in the section of this report entitled "Design Re- 
quirements and Criteria. '' A comprehensive soil-mechanics study (ref. A-4) was  
conducted in support of the LM landing analysis. 
formulated for various statistical studies of landing performance and for landing -load 
analysis. The statistical description used most extensively was based on topographical 
data from the Lunar Orbiter photography of the most severe Apollo landing site 
(fig. A-2). With the exception of one study, no attempt was made to establish statisti- 
cal values for soil properties. In general, the footpads were considered to be fully 
constrained for all studies, except for secondary-strut tension stroking for which a low 
friction coefficient is a crucial parameter. Although the specification defined 0.4 as 
the minimum value for the friction coefficient, lower values were investigated in 
secondary -strut strokeout studies. 
Statistical descriptions were also 
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Slope. deg Protuberance, m 
(a) Slope profile. (b) Protuberance profile. 
Figure A-2. - Lunar-surface description. 
TOUCHDOWN CONDITIONS 
111 addition to the lunar-surface characteristics, the initial conditions at footpad 
contact are extremely important factors in the LM landing-dynamics analysis. The 
initial conditions of vehicle attitude, angular rates, and linear velocities at touchdown 
have varied to some extent during the course of the LM development. However, the 
following final-specification values were used for most of the deterministic-analysis 
work (ref. 3). 
The angle between the LM X-axis and the local gravity vector must be 5 6", with 
yaw attitudes being a random variable. The angular-rate vector, which is based on the 
combined effects of the angular rate about each body axis, must be less than 2 deg/sec. 
The final-velocity envelope is defined by the vertical descent velocity Vv and the hori- 
zontal velocity Vh. 
10 ft/sec, vh = - 40
fixed-base pilot simulations of LM touchdown were used. 
For V 5 7 ft/sec, Vh = 4 ft/sec; and, for 7 ft/sec 5 Vv 5 
V 
Vv ft/sec. For the statistical landing analyses, data from 3 - 3  
LANDING-DYNAMICS MODEL TESTS 
Because of the heavy emphasis placed on analysis for demonstrating LM landing- 
performance adequacy, some means of verifying the basic analysis was required. To 
accomplish this, extensive 1/6 -scale-model and full-scale -model test programs were 
undertaken, and the results were correlated with the results of the landing-dynamics 
analysis. 
On e- S ixt  h- Sca I e- Mode I Tests 
One -sixth-scale -model tests were performed at the prime contractor facility and 
at the MSC. The results of the correlation of the model tests at the prime contractor 
facility with the analysis are presented in reference A-5. In general, the correlations 
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for  vehicle stability and landing-gear energy absorption were considered to be the most 
important. Instrumentation of the models permitted comparisons of acceleration, ve - 
locity, and displacement time histories with the analytical results. 
By using the technique of dynamic scaling, a model was designed that could be 
tested in the earth-gravity environment. 
1/6-dimensional scale and a (1/6) mass  scale, and the ratio of the model touchdown 
velocities to the touchdown velocities of the full-scale LM was 1.0. 
desirable characteristics of being untethered, of having a convenient size and weight 
for  handling, and of having easily obtainable mass  properties. Scale parts, including 
landing -gear energy absorbers, generally presented no great manufacturing problem. 
However, the fabrication of reliable 1/6 -scale honeycomb cartridges was an initial 
problem. The small number of cells in the scale cartridges caused cartridge instabil- 
ity during stroking, which resulted in poor load/stroke characteristics. The final test  
cartridges were handmade and contained a sufficient number of cells to provide repeat- 
able load/stroke characteristics. 
The resulting model was constructed to a 
3 
The model had the 
Because the models were constructed early in the LM development program, they 
did not represent la ter  LM detailed landing-gear and mass characteristics. However, 
the purpose of the model test program was to correlate results with the results of an 
analytical touchdown analysis; therefore, no attempt was made to keep the models con- 
tinuously updated to LM vehicle changes. A view of the LM model is shown in fig- 
ure  A-3, and the contractor drop-test facility is shown in figure A-4. The facility 
enabled simulation of initial conditions at touchdown, including both planar - and three - 
dimensional-type landings. In addition, the landing surface could include protuberances, 
depressions, and slopes as required, and a rigid surface o r  various types of soil could 
be used for the simulation. 
Figure A-3. - One-sixth-scale 
drop-test model. 
Examples of the comparison of 1/6- 
scale-model test results with the results 
of the analysis a r e  shown in figures A-5 
and A-6, which are taken from refer- 
ence A-5. A comparison of the stability 
boundaries obtained for  a particular drop 
condition at various vertical and horizontal 
velocities is shown in figure A-5. A com- 
parison of the time histories of both rigid- 
body acceleration and velocity is shown in 
figure A-6. These results are typical of 
the reasonably good correlation that was 
obtained between model and analysis re- 
sults. Good correlation was also obtained 
between predicted and measured strut  
strokes. Similar results were obtained 
with 1/6-scale-model tests at the MSC. 
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The scale model impacted wi th  
a 2-2 landing-year configu- 
rat ion and wi th  the nose u p  5". 
The impacted surface had a 5' 0 
downhil l  slope, wi th  &in. 
depressions in the area of 
forward-landing-year impact 
and with the footpads fu l ly  
constrained at impact. 
C 
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Figure A-4. - One-sixth-scale model Figure A-5. - One-sixth-scale-model 
te st/analy s is gross  correlation for and drop -test equipment at the 
prime contractor facility. symmetrical drops. 
- Experimental 
---- Analytical 
O t  \-,--- 
I I I- 
40f) 40 80 120 lk 2h l  2:O 2 i O  3iO 3dO 
Time. msec Time. msec 
(a) Horizontal velocity as a 
function of time. 
(b) Vertical velocity as a 
function of time. 
Figure A-6. - One-sixth-scale-model test/analysis time-history 
correlation for symmetrical drops. 
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(c) Horizontal acceleration as a 
function of time. 
(d) Vertical acceleration as a 
function of time. 
Figure A-6. - Concluded. 
Full-Scale-Model Tests 
In addition to the 1/6 -scale -model tests, a ser ies  of tests was performed using 
a fgU-scale mass  representation of the LM and a preproduction 167-inch-tread-radius 
$antilever-type landing gear. These tests were performed at LRC in a simulated lunar- 
gravity environment. 
'was suspended from cables, onto an in- 
clined plane, The plane was tilted at an 
"angle that provided one-sixth earth gravity 
normal to the vehicle landing surface. The 
'remaining weight of the vehicle was nulli- 
hed by supporting cables. Twenty-one 
drop tests were conducted in the ser ies  
using the vehicle shown in figure A-7. 
The lunar -gravity -simulation touchdown 
surface is also shown in figure A-7. Re- 
sults of the LRC test program and some 
comparisons of the test data with analyt- 
ical predictions are presented in refer- 
ences A-6 and A-?. 
The lunar gravity was simulated by dropping the model, which 
Although these tests were restricted 
to planar-type landings, much useful in- 
formation was obtained relative to the 
functional characteristics of the landing 
gear. The tests provided increased con- 
fidence in the LM-landing-gear functional 
operation and also provided test data for 
stability and energy -absorption evaluation. 
Figure A-7. - Simulated-lunar -gravity 
test vehicle and related equipment 
at the LRC. 
28 
Consideration was given to conducting simulated-lunar -gravity tests at the prime 
contractor facility, These tests would permit unsymmetrical-type landing simulations; 
however, this kind of test was not conducted because the high cost would not justify the 
limited amount of information that would have been gained. Numerous development 
problems encountered during the design of the lunar -gravity -simulation portion of the 
test equipment also contributed to the decision to cancel these tests. 
LANDING PERFORMANCE 
The landing-performance analysis has been used extensively as a tool in the LM 
landing -gear design and performance evaluation. Eanding-gear performance studies 
may be roughly divided into two categories: the deterministic- or worst-case-type 
analysis that was used for  landing-gear design and early performance evaluations, and 
the statistical or Monte Carlo analysis that w a s  used to predict the probability of a suc- 
cessful landing. 
Determin is t ic  Landing Ana lysis 
In initial design studies, only landings in which the vehicle c. g. motion was  
planar were considered. 
rical landings. 
and one trailing landing gear was designated the 1-2-1 case. The case with two landing 
gears leading and two trailing is called the 2-2 case. In general, for symmetrical land- 
ings, the 2 -2 case is stability critical, and the 1-2 -1 case is critical for priniary-strut 
energy -absorption requirements. 
Two landing-gear orientations were considered for symmet- 
The orientation with one leading landing gear, two side landing gears,  
As the analysis was  refined, unsymmetrical-type landings were considered. Two 
of the more important parameters in unsymmetrical-type landings a r e  yaw attitude and 
the vehicle flight-path angle. Typical unsymmetrical landing performances, which a r e  
based on a s e t  of critical landings, a r e  summarized in figures 10 and 11. The vehicle 
orientation and the lunar -surface conditions for  critical stability, primary-strut stroke, 
secondary -strut compression stroke, and secondary-strut tension stroke a r e  shown in 
figure 11. The stability and secondary-strut stroke boundaries a r e  critical for unsym- 
metrical landings. The primary-strut stroke is critical for the symmetrical 1-2  -1 land- 
ing case. The velocity envelope shown in figure 10 was the envelope chosen for design 
purposes in mid-1965 and is described in the section of this report entitled "Statistical 
Landing Performance. " 
Based on an LM touchdown weight of 16 000 earth pounds, the kinetic energy in- 
volved in a landing with a lO-ft/sec vertical velocity would be approximately 26 000 ft-lb. 
An additional energy contribution is provided by the potential energy. 
8000 ft-lb of potential energy could be involved as a result of a vehicle c. g. displace- 
ment of 3 feet from a combination of landing-gear stroking, vehicle touchdown attitude, 
and surface topography. One landing-gear assembly, which consists of all energy- 
absorption capability in the primary strut  and the two secondary struts, is equivalent to 
approximately 30 870 ft-lb (21 200 ft-lb in the primary s t rut  and 9670 ft-lb in the sec- 
ondary struts (5170 ft-lb in tension and 4500 ft-lb in compression)). The distribution of 
For example, 
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energy absorption for each landing-gear leg depends on many factors during the land- 
ing, but the value for the energy-absorption capability of each landing gear corresponds 
approximately to the design requirement for total energy absorption. 
Stati stica I Landing Analysis 
The analytical landing performance was based on combining touchdown initial 
conditions and lunar -surface conditions in an effort to obtain worst-case simulations. 
Because of the large number of parameters involved, it was not practical to establish 
with absolute certainty the worst possible combinations of parameters; therefore, to 
show that the worst-case design conditions constituted an extremely severe basis for 
performance evaluation, a statistical analysis of the landing -performance problem w a s  
conducted. 
For the initial statistical analysis, the four critical measurements of landing -gear 
performance (stability, primary-strut stroke, secondary -strut tension stroke, and 
secondary -strut compression stroke) were considered separately (refs. A-3 and A-8). 
This approach was taken to produce a conservative statistical analysis, because param - 
eters that are conservative for one performance measurement are not necessarily con- 
servative for another. For example, a low value for the footpad/soil friction coefficient 
may be critical for secondary -strut tension strokeout but not for vehicle stability, where 
full footpad constraint is the critical parameter. A summary of the major landing-gear 
performance analyses that were completed before the Apollo 11 lunar landing in 
July 1969 is contained in table A-I. 
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TABLE A-I. ~ LANDING-PERFORMANCE HISTORY O F  THE LM 
Primary strut 
(comparison) 
Type of 
analysis 
Deterministic, for 
critical-landing 
a cases 
Secondary strut 
(compression) 
Secondary strut 
(tension) Stability m t e  
Sept. 1965 
Oct. 1965 
June 1961 
Aug. 1968 
Lkc. 1966 
Apr. 1969 
~ 
June 1969 
'"Om 4 . 0  4 , o  '10 
'h 
4 * 1 0 f I l  4 , O  4.0 '10 
'h 
4,o 4 , o  
'h 
4 , o  4 , o  
'h 
4 , o  4 , o  
'h 
for (10-7-4) 
4 , o  4 , O  landing gear 
'h 
Lkierministic, for 
critical -landing 
casesb 
Statisticalb A 0,99999 probability of a 
stable landing 
A 0,99999 probability of using 
less than a 16-in. stroke 
No significant change from 
June 1961 results 
A 0,99999 probability of 
using less than an 6.5-in. 
stroke 
No significant change from 
June 1961 results 
A 0,99999 probabilily of using 
less than a 32-in. stroke 
~~ 
No significant change from 
June 1961 results 
Worst case,  with 
new thrust decayb 4 , l  
4 , o  
"h . 
Statistical, with 
new thrust decayb 
A 0.961 probabtiity for any 
lourhdown in the landing 
sile; a 0. 998 probability for 
a l andiy  on any slope less 
than 12 
A 0,999 probability of using 
less than a 30-in. stroke 
A 0.999 probability of using 
less than a 16-in. stroke 
A 0. 999 probability of using 
less than a 12-in. stroke 
Worst-case thrust 
unt i l  footpad 
contactb 
Stroke margin for lhis pro- 
cedure exre-ds thal for pro- 
cedure of engine shuldown 
31 probe ronlacl .  
Stroke margin for this pro- 
cedure exceeds thal for 
procedure of engine shut- 
down at probe conlact. 
Stroke margin for this pro- 
cedure exceeds lhat for pra- 
cedure of engine shutdown at 
probe contact. 
4 , o  
'h 
Statistical thrust 
u n t i l  footpad 
contactb 
~ 
A 0.986 probability for any 
touchdown in  the landing sile 
(based on 300 landings) 
A 0.995 probability of using 
less than a 12.0-rn. Slroke 
A 0,995 probability of using 
less than a 5.04".  stroke 
A 0.996 probability of using 
less than a 5.04".  stroke 
aOld 161-in. -tread-radius landing-pear load/slroke characteristics 
Primary s t r u t  (compression) E Secondary slrul  (compression) 
.$? I.* -1 iz 6O0OI, 
U 0 12 32 0 I 
E O  
a m  
E O  
U 
Secondary strut  (tension) 
Compression 
slroke, in. 
Compression 
stroke, in. 
b l h e  161-in. -tread-radius ( 1 0 - 1 - 4 )  iandinp-gear ioad/strake rhnracteristrcs: 
Primary s t ru t  (compression) Secondary s t r u t  (compressLon) ;: :q -1 f z  4 5 0 0 7 1  
a m  
U 0 0 12 2" 10 32 $: 
U 
Compression 
stroke, in. 
Conlprrssioll 
stroke. 111. 
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APPENDIX B 
HARDWARE DEVELOPMENT AND CERTI FICATI  ON TESTING 
The LM landing-gear design evolved from many studies during the period from 
mid-1962 until late 1964 when the 167-inch- tread-radius cantilever-type landing gear 
w a s  chosen as the basic design. During the course of the landing-gear development, 
extensive testing was undertaken to investigate specific areas of concern, such as 
primary- strut  bearings and honeycomb energy absorbers. Included in this appendix is 
a discussion of the component- and assembly-level testing of the landing gear during 
both the development and certification- test phases of the program. 
TEST-HISTORY SUMMARY 
A test history of the component, 
assembly, and model testing performed in 
support of the landing-gear development 
and certification is shown in figure B-1. 
The LM flight dates a r e  shown at the bot- 
tom of the figure. The test dates a r e  
approximate in some cases, but the chart 
gives an overall indication of the degree of 
testing performed. A s  can be seen, many 
honeycomb-cartridge development tests 
were performed, and many 1/6-scale- 
model drop tests were conducted to support 
the landing-analysis verification. 
Testing was performed for all signif- 
icant ground and flight environments during 
the development. In accordance with the 
Apollo Program test philosophy, certifica- 
tion testing was  accomplished on as com- 
plete a subsystem assembly as possible. 
Thus, landing-gear-assembly tests were 
used for the major portion of the certifica- 
tion program. Development and design- 
verification testing was per€ormed at both 
component and assembly levels. Model 
tests in support of the landing analysis are 
discussed in the section of appendix A en- 
titled "Landing-Dynamics Model Tests. " 
Test 
Component _____ 
Primary-strut 
bearings 
Primary-strut 
structure 
Secondary-strut 
structure 
Deployment mech 
anism for truss 
structure 
Footpad 
Honeycomb car- 
t ridges 
Lunar-surface- 
sensing probes 
Assembly 
Deployment 
Single-landlng- 
gear-assembly 
drop lest 
Vehicle drop test 
Vehicle vibration 
test 
Wdel  
116- scale- 
model drop tests 
Simulated- 
lunar-gravity 
drop tests ILRC) 
Apollo 
Flight 
Development -1 
Design verification 
Certification 
a 
C 
c 
717 
Calendar year 
Figure B-1-. - Test summary of the 
LM landing gear. 
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DE PLOY MENT TESTS 
Extensive landing-gear deployment tests were conducted, beginning with the 
160-inch-tread-radius landing-gear design. Tests were conducted in ambient, salt-fog, 
and thermal-vacuum environments, with the majority conducted under ambient condi- 
tions. Deployment testing was generally conducted with the landing-gear-assembly 
axis of deployment in the vertical position; that is, the primary-strut longitudinal axis 
was perpendicular to the gravity vector. To minimize gravity effects, a cable was 
attached to the landing gear near its c. g. 
Energy requirements for landing-gear deployment were generally determined by 
testing. Because of the complexity of the landing-gear motions during deployment and 
because of the difficulty of accurately estimating friction loads at the bearing joints, 
the deployment energy requirements were only grossly predicted by analysis. 
Simulated-zero-gravity deployment tests were used as a design tool to verify the deploy- 
ment energy requirements and to test the deployment- mechanism hardware concepts. 
During early deployment testing, much design information was obtained about the 
'deployment-mechanism functionality and deployment time. Strut loads were measured 
to determine the magnitudes of the loads induced by the deployment shock. Honeycomb- 
cartridge lengths in the secondary strut  were measured to determine if  any honeycomb 
crushing occurred as a result of the inertial forces produced by deployment. Loads 
induced into the LM structure by deployment were measured also. Quantitative data 
from later tests performed on flight-type hardware consisted primarily of deployment- 
time information. This information was used to verify that changes to the landing-gear 
thermal insulation had not adversely affected deployment and to verify the accuracy of 
the landing-gear checkout tests at the prime contractor facility and at the launch site, 
The landing-gear -assembly deployment tests (development, design verification, and 
certification), beginning with initial ground-test hardware and concluding with flight- 
vehicle checkout and flight-test results, a r e  summarized in table B-I. All deployment- 
test  failures and the cause of each failure a r e  also summarized. As indicated in 
table B-I, almost 250 individual landing-gear deployments have been made through the 
Apollo 11 mission. Detailed information on the development, design-verification, and 
certification tests may be found in references B-1 to B-9. 
Two deployment failures occurred during certification and checkout testing: one 
during a thermal-vacuum certification test and the other during factory checkout of the 
Apollo 9 landing gear. The certification-test failure resulted from the use of an im- 
proper lubricant in the deployment springs during a thermal-vacuum test at a temper- 
ature of -150" F. In this instance, the landing gear deployed and locked, but not within 
the specified time. With the correct lubricant on the springs, operation was nominal. 
The deployment failure on the Apollo 9' landing gear during factory checkout resulted 
from two deficiencies: 
ing joint and marginal energy in both deployment springs of the failed landing gear. 
insulation was redesigned in the vicinity of the deployment joints, the required spring 
energy was increased, and more rigid acceptance-test requirements were imposed on 
the deployment-spring assemblies. Component tes ts  of the leaf-type deployment spring 
consisted primarily of functional tests under various environments and of fatigue tests 
(ref. B-10). 
thermal-insulation interference with a deployment- t russ  rotat- 
The 
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T A B L E  B-1. - LANDING-GEAR D E P L O Y M E N T - T E S T  SUMMARY 
T y p e  of 
t e s t  
l e v e l o p m e n t  
Development 
Design 
ver i f ica t ion  
Des ign  
ver i f ica t ion  
C e r t i f i c a t i o n  
c e r t i f i c a t i o n  
C e r t i f i c a t i o n  
Checkout  
F l igh t  
Conf igura t ion  
\ 160-in.  - t r e a d - r a d i u s  
landing  g e a r  wi th  c o i l  
deployment  s p r i n g s  
A 160- in .  - t r e a d - r a d i u s  
landing  g e a r  wi th  l e d -  
type  deployment  
A 167-in.  - t r e a d - r a d i u s  
landing  g e a r  (10-7-4)  
A  167-111. - t r e a d - r a d i u s  
landing  g e a r  (10-7-4)  
A  167-111. - t r e a d - r a d i u s  
landing  g e a r  (10-7-4)  
A 167- in .  - t r e a d - r a d i u s  
landing  g e a r  (10-7-4)  
A 167- in .  - t r e a d - r a d i u s  
landing  g e a r  (10-7-4)  
Apollo 9 to  11 
Apollo 9 to  11 
T e s t  o b j e c t i v e s  
ro e v a l u a t e  functionally 
To d e t e r m i n e  l o a d s  into s t r u c t u r e  
and i n t o  landing-gear  s t r u t s  
To d e t e r m i n e  e f f e c t s  on s e c o n d a r y -  
s t r u t  honeycomb 
To e v a l u a t e  func t iona l ly  
T o  e v a l u a t e  new type  s p r i n g  
T o  e s t a b l i s h  pref l igh t  checkout  
c r i t e r i a  
T o  d e t e r m i n e  e f f e c t s  oi t h e r m a l  
insu la t ion  
T o  e v a l u a t e  functionally 
T o  d e t e r m i n e  e f f e c t s  of t h e r m a l  
insu la t ion  
To e v a l u a t e  functionally 
T o  e v a l u a t e  functionally 
T o  e v a l u a t e  functionally 
T o  e v a l u a t e  functionally (a t  
f a c t o r y  and KSC) 
T o  deploy opera t iona l ly  
E n v i r o n m e n t  
S imula ted  z e r o  
g r a v i t y  
S imula ted  z e r o  
g r a v i t y  
E a r t h  g r a v i t y :  
a m b i e n t  
S imula ted  z e r o  
g r a v i t y :  
ambient  
S imula ted  z e r o  
g r a v i t y  
S imula ted  z e r o  
gravi ty  
S imula ted  z e r o  
g r a v i t y :  
ambient  
E a r t h  g r a v i t y :  
ambient  
S p a c e  
N u m b e r  of 
deployments  
59 
41 
24 
49 
7 
8 
.~ 
6 
37 
12 
R e m a r k s  
In 54 ambient  t e s t s ,  o n e  f a i l u r e  
to  lock  down f r o m  a p a r t i a l l y  
deployed pos i t ion  when one  
deployment  s p r i n g  w a s  u s e d :  
in f i v e  s a l t - f o g  t e s t s ,  one 
f a i l u r e  to  deploy  when  o n e  
deployment  s p r i n g  only w a s  
used  
~ 
One f a i l u r e  to  lock  down f r o m  
a  p a r t i a l l y  deployed pos i t ion  
when 1 6  p e r c e n t  of nominal  
t o r q u e  w a s  used  
One f a i l u r e  to  ful ly  deploy  with 
one  s p r i n g  r e m o v e d :  one  f a i l -  
u r e  to  deploy  when a t r u s s  
pivot f i t t ing w a s  in ten t iona l ly  
j a m m e d  
Two ambient ,  f ive  t h e r m a l -  
vacuum:  one  f a i l u r e  to lock  
down b e c a u s e  of i m p r o p e r l y  
lubr ica ted  s p r i n g s  in t h e r m a l  
vacuum t e s t  
. ~~ 
SIX a m b i e n t ;  two sa l t - fop  
One f a i l u r e  on Apollo 9 b e c a u s e  
of j a m m e d  insu la t ion  and 
m a r g i n a l  s p r i n g  t o l e r a n c e s  
_ _  
ASSEMBLY DROP TESTS 
A summary of landing-gear drop tests, including single -landing -gear -assembly 
tests, vehicle structural drop tests, and vehicle tests in a simulated-lunar-gravity 
environment, is given in table B-II. Almost 90 single-landing-gear-assembly drop 
tests and approximately 40 vehicle-level tes ts  were performed. Al l  the single-landing- 
gear-assembly tests and the structural drop tes ts  were performed at the prime con- 
tractor facility. The vehicle-level simulated-lunar-gravity tes ts  were conducted at the 
LRC in support of the landing-gear development program. For these tests, a vehicle 
with a mass that was  representative of the LM and a flight-configuration landing gear 
were used. Landing-gear-assembly drop tes ts  for single-landing-gear legs were con- 
ducted at the prime contractor facility for  the three distinct cantilever -type landing- 
gear designs that reached the hardware-test phase of development (refs. B-11 to B-14). 
These tests, which were performed under ambient conditions, verified the functional 
and structural adequacy of the landing-gear assemblies; however, a few tests were 
conducted with the primary s t rut  in a dry-nitrogen-gas environment to eliminate humid- 
ity effects on the strut-bearing dry-film lubricant. The tes ts  were conducted at impact 
velocities that were representative of the specification vertical touchdown velocities. , 
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TABLE 8-II. - LANDING-GEAR DROP-TEST SUMMARY 
Type of test 
Development 
Development 
Design 
verification 
Certificationa 
Certification 
Certification 
Developmentb 
Configuration 
~~ 
A 160-in. - t read-radius  
single -landing-gear 
assembly 
A 167-in. - t read-radius  
single -landing-gear 
assembly 
A 167-in. - t read-radius  
(10-7-4) single- 
landing-gear assembly 
~~ 
A 167-in. - t read-radius  
(10-7-4) single- 
landing-gear assembly 
~~ .. . 
~ 
LM vehicle s t ruc ture  
LM vehicle sys tems 
~ ~~~~ 
A 167-in. - t read-radius  
(10-7-4) type (honey- 
comb car t r idges)  on 
mass-s imulated LM 
- ~ 
Test  objectives 
To evaluate basic  landing- 
gear  functional and s t r u c -  
tu ra l  design concepts 
To evaluate functional and 
s t ruc tura l  concepts 
To evaluate functional and 
s t ructural  concepts 
- 
To evaluate the functional, 
s t ructural ,  and energy-  
absorption charac te r i s t ics  
following landing-gear ex-  
posure to thermal-vacuum 
and vibration environments 
~~ - -. 
To determine the vehicle 
s t ructural  adequacy f o r  
c r i t i ca l  landing conditions 
To determine the vehicle s y s -  
t e m s  adequacy f o r  c r i t i ca l  
landing conditions 
. ~ ..___ 
~~~ ~ . -  ~~~ ~~ 
ro  demonstrate  landing-gear 
functional adequacy and 
two-dimensional toppling 
stability 
. 
Environment 
E a r t h  gravity: 
ambient 
Ear th  gravity: 
ambient 
Earth gravity; 
ambient 
Earth gravity: 
ambient 
3arth gravity: 
ambient 
Zarth gravity; 
ambient 
. - ._____ 
iimulated lunar 
gravity: 
ambient 
\lumber o 
d rops  
27 
- 
24 
33 
4 
- 
17 
5 
21 
aLunar-surface-sensing probe certified in two of these tes ts .  
bTests  conducted at LRC in support of the landing-gear-development program; resu l t s  correlated 
with landing-performance analysis. 
Although the test facility provided the capability to simulate only vertical touchdown 
velocities, various types of surfaces could be represented, including rigid surfaces, 
soils, slopes, and obstructions. The landing gear was attached to a carriage and 
ballasted to provide the required impact kinetic energy. 
The tower drop-test equipment at the prime contractor.facility is shown in fig- 
ure  B-2. The landing gear is configured for a symmetrical drop onto a rigid surface. 
To conserve flight-type footpads, many of the drop tests onto hard surfaces were per- 
formed with "workhorse" footpads, which could be used repeatedly. For drop tests 
into simulated lunar soils, flight-type footpads were used. 
Although the test equipment was limited to vertical velocity drops, a wide range 
of landing-gear impact conditions could be simulated. A landing gear configured for  an 
unsymmetrical drop onto a rigid surface, with the footpad being fully constrained from 
sliding at impact, is shown in figure B-3. This configuration would result in primary- 
s t rut  stroking, compression stroking in the upper secondary strut, and tension stroking 
in the lower secondary strut. A landing gear with a flight-type footpad is shown in fig- 
u re  B-4 after impact into a simulated lunar soil. 
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Figure B-2. - Landing-gear drop-test 
equipment. 
Figure B-3. - Landing gear configured for 
unsymmetrical drop test. 
COMPONENT TESTS 
Tests at the component level were per- 
formed on all major landing-gear compo- 
nents. In addition, extensive component 
testing was accomplished during develop- 
ment of the primary-strut bearings and the 
honeycomb energy-absorbing cartridges for 
both primary and secondary struts. 
Bea r i ng D eve I opm en t 
It was recognized early in the landing- 
gear development program that friction in 
the strut  cylinders would have to be main- 
tained within reasonable tolerances to ensure 
proper control of landing loads induced into 
the LM structure. Based on this require- 
ment, the prime contractor extensively in- 
vestigated various types of bearings and 
bearing lubricants. 
Figure B-4. - Landing gear following drop 
into simulated lunar soil. 
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Initially, bearing friction tests were performed in  early 1965 on a 180-inch-tread- 
radius landing-gear primary s t rut  (ref. B-15). These tests consisted of an investiga- 
tion of two types of molydisulfide dry-film lubricant and two bearing shapes. The two 
bearing shapes considered were cylindrical sleeves and sleeves with slightly convex 
bearing surfaces. Tests were conducted over a temperature range of +150° to -80" F, 
which resulted in  a range of friction coefficients from 0.25 to 0.365. 
From February 1965 to March 1966, additional bearing friction tests were per- 
formed on a 160-inch-tread-radius landing-gear primary-strut assembly (ref. B-16). 
Based on the results of these tests, the prime contractor recommended that a molydi- 
sulfide dry-film lubricant be used on the primary-strut bearings because it provided a 
low friction coefficient that remained fairly constant over the temperature range of 
-80" to +135" F and because it had good loading characteristics, a long service life, 
and good corrosion resistance. 
25 to 100 percent of maximum values, and stroking velocities were as high as 
15 ft/sec. Based on the results of these tests, a bearing friction coefficient of 0.20 
was generally used in landing-performance and landing-load analyses. 
For this se r ies  of tests, strut  side loads ranged from 
Al l  the previously mentioned testing was conducted under atmospheric conditions. 
Additional component tests were conducted in a vacuum environment to determine 
vacuum effects on the dry-film-lubricant friction and wear characteristics. These 
tests indicate a slight decrease in the friction coefficient in a vacuum. In addition to 
the tests performed specifically for bearing friction study, the dynamic drop tests of 
landing-gear assemblies were used to obtain-bearing friction-coefficient data and to 
validate the adequacy of the bearing designs for the primary and secondary struts. 
Static Structural Tests 
Static structural tests were performed on the landing gear at the major-component 
level. The components tested were the primary strut, secondary strut, deployment 
truss,  footpad, and lunar-surface-sensing probe. Except for the footpad tests, all the 
tests were conducted at room temperature, with the results being modified to account 
for the design structural temperatures. 
The primary-strut tes ts  (ref. B-17) were accomplished by applying a static axial 
load to the strut, with a dynamic side load being applied at the secondary-strut attach- 
ment point. These tests verified the dynamic-amplification factors used in the struc- 
tural analysis and demonstrated the structural adequacy of the strut. Immediately 
before the flight of Apollo 11, some concern was  generated with respect to the landing- 
gear structural adequacy because of higher predicted temperatures at landing. Using 
a flight-article primary strut, failure load tes ts  were conducted to determine the 
landing-gear structural margin (ref. B-18). Static tests of the secondary strut  were 
conducted to demonstrate the functional adequacy of the strut, to demonstrate its struc- 
tural integrity, to obtain data for correlation with the landing-gear stress-analysis 
data, and to establish the structural margins of safety (ref. B-19). Unlike the primary 
strut, which was designed primarily from bending-load data, the secondary strut  was 
designed primarily from axial-load data. 
Deployment-truss static tests (ref. B-20) were used to demonstrate the structural 
integrity of the t russ  and to provide data for correlation with the structural-analysis 
data. All components of the t ru s s  were subjected to failure loads. 
tests of the trunnion fitting that attaches the deployment t russ  to the descent-stage 
structure also were conducted (ref. B-21). 
Static ultimate-load 
Footpad-Com ponen t Tests 
Component tests of various footpad configurations began early in the landing- gear 
Because of the unknown characteristics of the landing site, a footpad that could 
Furthermore, the footpad 
2 test program. The footpad was  required to sustain a 12-lb/in normal-pressure load- 
ing. 
sustain crushing against various obstacles was  required. 
should plane adequately while sliding over the lunar surface because of a horizontal 
velocity component at touchdown. 
sibility of the footpad digging into the lunar soil and being ripped away from the pri- 
mary strut. 
This specification was  required to preclude the pos- 
The footpad component-level tests demonstrated the strength of the footpad when 
subjected to a uniformly distributed normal load and evaluated the load/stroke charac- 
terist ics of the footpad when laterally crushed against obstacles of various shapes. 
Normal-load component tests were conducted at room temperature and at 225" F. 
footpad was tested dynamically during the landing-gear-assembly drop tests. 
crushing tests were conducted at various load rates  and with a variety of obstacle 
shapes. Lateral crushing of flight- type footpads was  also investigated during landing- 
gear-assembly drop tes ts  onto hard surfaces. Details of the footpad-component tests 
a r e  contained in references B-22 to B-25. 
The 
Side-load 
Honeycomb Energy Absorber 
The choice of a method for absorbing the LM impact energy at touchdown is based 
The energy absorber must have 
on several requirements. 
ing, the energy absorber does not have to be recycled. 
load/stroke characteristics that a r e  predictable, within close limits, in order to con- 
trol  the loads induced into the vehicle structure. Light weight, compatibility with the 
space environment, and simplicity a r e  other desirable features. Early in the LM 
development program, various devices were evaluated in the search for an energy 
absorber that met these requirements. Initial investigations by the prime contractor 
indicated that crushable honeycomb could fulfill the requirements and could be developed 
within the constraints of the Apollo Program schedule. 
Because the landing gear is required for only a single land- 
It became evident early in  the honeycomb-development program that several fac- 
to rs  influence the load level at which honeycomb crushes. The primary factors are 
manufacturing tolerances, temperature, and impact velocity. 
that have a significant effect on the strength of the honeycomb are the expansion of the 
hobe (the basic block of alternate layers of aluminum foil and adhesive that is expanded 
to form the honeycomb core), the foil thickness, the foil material properties, and the 
adhesive application and curing method. Honeycomb temperature also has a significant 
effect on the crush strength, with the crush strength decreasing as temperature in- 
creases. The crush-load level for an impact velocity is approximately 10 percent 
greater than the static crush-load level, and this increment is approximately constant 
over a range of 3 to 12 ft/sec. 
Manufacturing tolerances 
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These effects were investigated extensively by the prime contractor during devel- 
opment of honeycomb cartridges that were suitable for use on the landing gear. Manu- 
facturing tolerances were reduced to approximately i 2 percent for the final flight-type 
cartridges. Velocity effects were accounted for in sizing the cartridges, and tempera- 
ture effects were reduced to acceptable levels by providing thermal insulation on the 
landing- gear struts.  
The variations in the crush-load levels have been considered in the LM structural- 
load and landing-performance analyses. In the landing-performance studies, an ex- 
tensive analysis of the effects of cartridge temperature on vehicle stability and 
energy-absorption requirements was performed. Honeycomb-development and design- 
verification- test results are contained in references B-26 to B-30. 
LUNAR-SURFACE-SENS ING-PROBE QUAL1 FICATION TESTS 
During the course of hardware development, two distinct sensing probes were 
used in flight. A 4. &foot probe was used on the Apollo 9 and 10 missions, and a 
5.6-foot probe was  used on the Apollo 11 mission. Both probe designs underwent com- 
plete qualification-test programs. Details of the qualification of the 5.6-foot probe a r e  
contained in reference B-31. With the exception of probe certification in drop tests, 
certification was  accomplished by the probe-hardware vendor. 
Two probe assemblies were subjected to all significant mission-level environ- 
ments, including shock, vibration, and thermal-vacuum environments. The electro- 
mechanical sensing- switch operation was monitored during testing, and the 
probe-deployment mechanism was checked. Before qualification of the early model 
4.5-fOOt probe, extensive development testing was  performed by the vendor under the 
cognizance of the prime contractor. 
CERTI F I CAT1 ON SUMMARY 
All certification-level tes ts  a r e  listed in table B-III. Also provided is a brief 
description of the tests, information about the level of assembly, and whether the test 
was  an original requirement or  was  added because of a design change o r  a new qualifi- 
cation requirement. The flight hardware is compared with the certified hardware in 
table B-IV. Some design changes did not necessitate complete hardware recertifica- 
tion for various reasons. These design changes, together with the reasons the flight 
configuration was considered to be adequate, a r e  a lso listed in table B-IV. Where 
practical, analysis was  performed to demonstrate the adequacy of the flight hardware; 
however, in some cases, configuration differences were so  minor that the flight hard- 
ware was  determined to be adequate by design similarity. 
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TABLE B-III. - CERTIFICATION SUMMARY OF THE LM LANDING-GEAR SUBSYSTEM 
Title of test 
Qualification test  of 4.5-ft lunar- 
surface-sensing probe 
Landing-gear deployment in a 
thermal-vacuum environment 
Landing-gear deployment in a 
salt-fog environment 
Landing-gear and landing-gear- 
uplock compatibility 
Footpad structural  adequacy 
Lunar -surface -sensing-probe 
drop tests 
Landing-gear-assembly drop tests 
Delta-qualification test of 4.5-ft 
lunar-surface-sensing probe 
Compatibility of 5.6-ft lunar- 
surface-sensing probe with 
landing - gear uploc k 
Qualification test of 5.6-ft lunar- 
surface-sensing probe 
Landing-performance adequacy 
of LM 
Landing-gear response to launch 
and boost vibration 
Landing-gear response to descent- 
engine vibration 
Structural drop test of LM 
Type of test 
Component 
Landing-gear 
assembly 
Landing-gear 
assembly 
Landing-ge ar 
assembly 
Analysis 
Landing - ge ar 
assembly 
Landing-gear 
assembly 
Component 
Landing-gear 
assembly 
Component 
Analysis 
Vehicle 
Vehicle 
Vehicle 
Effectivity 
Apollo 9 and subsequent 
Apollo 9 and subsequent 
Apollo 9 and subsequent 
Apollo 9 and subsequent 
Apollo 11 and subsequent 
Apollo 11 and subsequent 
Apollo 11 and subsequent 
Apollo 11 and subsequent 
Apollo 11 and subsequent 
Apollo 11 and subsequent 
Apollo 11 to 14 
Apollo 9 and subsequent 
Apollo 9 and subsequent 
Apollo 11 to 14 
Requirement 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Delta-qualification for new 
vibration-acceptance-test 
requirement 
Delta-qualification require- 
ment because of lengthenet 
probe 
Requalification because of 
new probe length 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
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TABLE B-IV. - COMPARISON O F  CERTIFIED AND FLIGHT-CONFIGURATION HARDWARE 
Hardware 
Thermal  blankets and 
plume shielding 
Landing-gear -deployment 
spring 
Honeycomb cartridges 
Strut-bearing clearances 
Sonic inspection of 
machine par t s  
Liquid shim 
Suit hazards 
Backup visual downlock 
indicator for  landing 
gear 
Footpad restraint  s t raps  
Overcenter s t r ap  
Uplock retaining nut and 
bolt 
Lunar -surf ace - sensing 
probe 
Flight configuration Qualification 
configuration 
Significant differences 
. 
None 
Nine-leaf spring in 
therm a1 -vac uum 
test 
No node bond strength 
requirement 
No requirement for  
high temperatures 
caused by fire until 
touchdown heating 
~ - _  .. 
plight blankets and 
shielding 
0-leaf spring 
Jode peel strength 
acceptance -test 
requirement 
:learances increased to 
allow fo r  thermal  
expansion 
Minor differences 
-.  - 
None 
None 
Cotter pins and nuts 
with sharp  edges 
None 
Aluminum alloy 
Strap on landing gear  
for  vibration tes t s  
Standard bolt and self 
locking nut 
The 4.5-ft probe in 
thermal-vacuum 
deployment and in 
drop tes t s  
P a r t s  received sonic 
inspect ion 
Liquid shim on mating 
surfaces 
Cotter pins removed 
and sharp-edged nuts 
capped 
Visual indicator con- 
sisting of paint s t r ipes  
on downlock 
Titanium 
No overcenter s t r ap  
Shoulder bolt and castel- 
lated nut 
The 5.6-ft probe 
Rat ionale 
- . . 
Thermal  analysis and 
functional tests 
Delta-qualification with 
10-leaf spring and 
thermal blankets 
installed 
Quality control requireme 
Thermal  analysis and func 
tional tes t s  
Quality -control requireme 
Stress-corrosion preventi 
Crew systems requiremen 
Crew systems requiremen 
Analysis 
Analysis 
Analysis 
Ambient deployment tes t  
and analysis 
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B-22. Anon. : Results of the LEM Landing Gear Component Development Tests, 
Section D - Results of the Static Test of the LEM Landing Gear Footpad 
LSK-320-10702. Rept. LTR 904-10001D, Grumman Aircraft Engineering 
Corp., Feb. 14, 1966. 
B-23. Anon. : Results of the LEM Landing Gear  Component Development Tests, 
Section J - Results of the Static Test of the LEM Landing Gear Footpad 
LSK-320-10704. Rept. LTR 904-10001. Grumman Aircraft Engineering 
Corp., Feb. 28, 1966. 
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B-24. Anon. : Results of the LEM Landing Gear Component Development Tests, 
Section M - Results of the Static Test of the LEM Landing Gear Footpad 
LSK-320-10707. 
Corp., Feb. 12, 1966. 
Rept. LTR 904-10001, Grumman Aircraft Engineering 
B-25. Anon. : Results of the LEM Landing Gear Component Development Tests, 
Section Q - Results of the Normal Load Test of Footpad LTM-320-H-10701. 
Rept. LTR 904-10001, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., Aug. 9, 1966. 
B-26. Anon. : Design Data Derived From Preliminary Testing of Honeycomb Car- 
tridge. Rept. LTR 320-4, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. , 
Jan. 14, 1966. 
B-27. Anon. : Results of the LEM Landing Gear  Component Development Tests, 
Section B - Crushable Cartridges - Intermediate and Full Size. 
Rept. LTR 904-10001, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. , Jan. 6, 1967. 
B-28. Anon. : Results of the LEM Landing Gear  Component Development Tests, 
Section P - Crushable Honeycomb Cartridges for the 160" and 167" Landing 
Gear Assemblies. Rept. LTR 904-1 0001, Grumman Aircraft Engineering 
Corp., Apr. 5, 1967. 
B-29. Anon. : Results of Tests on the 167" (10-7-4) Landing Gear Honeycomb Car- 
tridges - Block I. Rept. LTR 904-14010, Grumman Aircraft Engineering 
Corp., June 16, 1967. 
B-30. Anon. : Design Data Derived From the Intermediate Testing of Honeycomb 
Cartridges. Rept. LTR 320-13, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. , 
Aug. 18, 1967. 
B-31. Anon. : Final Report - Qualification Test of the 5 .6  Foot Lunar Surface Sensing 
Probe for LM. Rept. 8342, rev. A, Edo Corp. , Mar.  1969. 
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APPENDIX C 
D ETA LED CONFIGURATION DESCR 
PRIMARY STRUT 
PTION 
A sketch of the primary strut  is shown in figure 6. The strut  consists of a lower 
inner cylinder that fits into an upper outer cylinder to provide compression stroking at 
touchdown. The primary strut (which includes an outer-cylinder upper universal 
fitting attached to the LM-descent- stage outrigger assembly and an inner-cylinder 
lower ball fitting attached to the footpad) is approximately 10 feet in length in the un- 
stroked position. Within the inner cylinder is the energy-absorbing material, a crush- 
able aluminum-honeycomb core that has design load/stroke characteristics as shown in 
figure 7. The honeycomb characteristics and design features a r e  discussed in more 
detail in appendix El. 
The primary-strut structural safety factor is 1.35, and the safety factor on all 
fittings is 1.50. The strut  is manufactured from type 7178 aluminum alloy. The inner 
cylinder is nominally 5.5 inches in diameter. The wall thickness ranges from 
0. 150 inch near the ball fitting, where design bending moments a r e  relatively small, 
to approximately 0.255 inch near the outer-cylinder juncture, where the design 
bending moment is more than 300 000 in-lb. 
To control the axial loads imposed on the primary strut  because of stroking, the 
honeycomb crush loads and the axial load that results from friction in the bearings must 
be controlled within specified limits. The development of the primary- strut  bearings 
required a significant effort and is discussed in detail in appendix B. The cantilever- 
type design of the landing gear results in high lateral loads on the primary strut  because 
of secondary-strut axial loads, which must be considered in the bearing design. The 
aluminum-sleeve-type bearing over which the cylinder slides is coated with a molydi- 
sulfide dry-film lubricant. For the upper bearing, the inner surface of the outer cylin- 
der acts  as the sleeve, and the inner-cylinder bearing surface is a machined part  of 
the cylinder. All  bearing surfaces a r e  coated with the molydisulfide dry-film lubri- 
cant. The lower bearing is threaded into the lower end of the outer cylinder. The outer 
surface of the inner cylinder, which is also coated with the dry-film lubricant, slides 
against the bearing surface. 
in a nominal energy-absorption capability of 254 000 in-lb per primary strut. 
The strut  is capable of a 32-inch stroke, which results 
The distance between the upper and lower bearings is approximately 33 inches 
before stroking. Based on a bearing diameter of 5.5 inches, the bearing overlap ratio 
is 6.0, with the ratio increasing as the landing gear strokes. In the design of a strok- 
ing member where binding is intolerable and where loads caused by bearing friction 
must be controlled, the ratio should be at least 3.0. However, the ratio must be larger  
if the members a r e  subjected to large side loads, as is the case with the primary strut. 
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SECONDARY STRUT 
The secondary strut  (fig. 8) is similar to the primary-strut basic design in that 
it consists of an inner cylinder that slides into an outer cylinder during stroking. The 
honeycomb shock and energy-absorbing material is contained within both the inner and 
outer cylinders and has nominal load/stroke characteristics (fig. 9). 
The secondary strut  is approximately 4 feet in length when unstroked, and the 
outer cylinder is approximately 4. 5 inches in diameter. The outer-cylinder ball fitting 
is attached to a socket on the primary strut, and the inner-cylinder end fitting is 
attached to the deployment truss.  The strut cylinders a r e  manufactured from type 2024 
aluminum. The wall thickness varies from 0.027 inch for the outer cylinder to 
0.033 inch for the inner cylinder. 
Because the secondary strut  is designed primarily to sustain axial loads (with 
only small lateral loads), the problem of designing bearings for stroking was relatively 
simple. The design lateral-inertial load factor for the strut  is 20g. The main 
secondary- strut bearing consists of a Teflon-impregnated fabric sleeve that is bonded 
to the inner wall of the outer cylinder a t  the open end of the cylinder (fig. 8). The 
sleeve is approximately 3.25 inches long and approximately 0.014 inch thick. A 
similar type of bearing is attached to the inner cylinder. 
A s  shown in figure 9, the secondary strut  is capable of absorbing energy for  
both tension and compression stroking. The nominal energy-absorption capability is 
62 000 in-lb in tension and 54 000 in-lb in compression, for a total of 116 000 in-lb 
per secondary-strut assembly. 
Once a secondary strut  is stroked, for either tension o r  compression, the slack 
that results from the stroke must be taken up before energy absorption can occur in 
the opposite direction. This no-load slack condition is unlikely to occur in an actual 
landing situation and presented no problems during landing-gear-assembly ground tests. 
DEPLOYMENT TRUSS 
The deployment-truss assembly (fig. 4) consists of two main crossmembers and 
four side members. In the deployed position, the t russ  acts  as a rigid structure to 
which the secondary s t ruts  a r e  attached. The landing- gear deployment and downlock 
mechanism is attached to the deployment t russ  and pulls on the t russ  lower side mem- 
bers  to deploy the entire landing-gear assembly. The upper side members of the t russ  
lock into the downlock mechanism, which is attached to the descent-stage structure. 
In the stowed position, both the t russ  and the entire landing gear are kept rigid by two 
uplock chocks (fig. 2), which extend downward from the descent stage. In the stowed 
position, each chock has approximately 350 pounds of compression load, and the uplock 
strap (fig. C-1) has approximately 1100 pounds of tension load. These loads prevent 
landing-gear movement that might result from launch and boost vibration. The major 
components of the deployment t russ  are fabricated from type 7079 and type 7178 
aluminum alloy. 
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DEPLOYMENT AND DOWNLOCK 
MECHANISM 
Descent 
The deployment and downlock mech- 
anism (fig. C-2) performs two distinct 
operations: deployment of the landing- 
gear assembly by a linkage attached to 
the deployment t russ  and rigid latching 
of the landing gear in place after deploy- 
ment has been accomplished. 
Pr imary-s t ru t  
assembly 
The deployment portion of the 
mechanism consists of a spring and a 
mechanical linkage. The spring consists 
of 10  individual stainless steel leaves. 
The leaves, which a r e  coated with the 
dry-film lubricant, slide freely over one 
another as the spring rolls up. The Figure C-1. - Landing-gear uplock 
mechanism . 
/Downlock switch wi th  
visual indicator 
LM descent stage 
Landing-gear- assembly 
Deployment 
t russ 
Truss-support l i n k  
visual indicator, 
lock ro l ler  wi th  
(a) Stowed position. (b) Down and locked position. 
Figure C-2. - Landing-gear deployment and downlock mechanism. 
48 
I 
linkage is attached from the descent-stage structure to the lower side member of the 
landing-gear deployment truss. One end of the deployment spring is attached to this 
linkage; the other end is coiled around a roller that is attached to the descent-stage 
structure. In the stowed position, energy is stored in the deployment springs. When 
the uplock strap is severed to release the landing gear, the deployment spring rolls up 
and pulls on the linkage, causing the deployment t russ  to rotate and deploy the landing 
gear. 
The downlock portion of the mechanism consists of a spring-loaded latch attached 
to the descent-stage structure and a latch roller on the upper side member of the de- 
ployment truss. When the landing gear is retracted, the latch is held open because the 
cam follower r e s t s  on the cam of the cam idler crank. A s  the landing gear deploys, 
the cam rotates; and, at full deployment, the cam follower drops off the cam ramp, 
which allows the spring to snap the latch over the latch roller. This secures the roller 
against a stop on the structure. A s  latching occurs, two electrical downlock switches 
a r e  actuated, which closes the circuit to the landing-gear-deployment indicator in the 
cabin. Both downlocks on each landing-gear assembly must be properly latched for the 
landing-gear-deployment indicator to signal that the landing gear is down and locked. 
In the event of a malfunction of the landing-gear-deployment electrical circuitry, 
a visual backup indicator has been devised to allow the command module pilot to verify 
that all downlocks have latched. The visual indicator consists of a red luminescent 
stripe painted on both sides of the downlock latch and on the end of the latch roller that 
is attached to the truss-roller support member (fig. C-2). If the landing gear is prop- 
erly locked, the stripe shows as an unbroken straight line. If a downlock is not 
achieved, the paint stripe shows as a broken line. 
LUNAR-SURFACE-SENSING PROBE 
Attached to each footpad except the one on the forward landing gear is a 5.6-foot- 
long lunar- surface- sensing probe that is designed to sense lunar- surface proximity and 
signal the pilot to cut off the descent engine. The lunar-surface-sensing probe is shown 
in the stowed and deployed positions in figure 2. The probe consists of two major com- 
ponents: the boom assembly, which contains a deployment mechanism, and the probe- 
switch subassembly, which is an electromechanical device. Actuation of the switch on 
contact with the lunar surface causes two blue lunar-contact lights to be illuminated in 
the cabin, which signals the crew to shut down the descent engine manually. 
The probe boom assembly consists of two components that a r e  hinged at the de- 
The upper portion of the boom is bolted to 
ployment mechanism. The probe boom is made from type 2024 aluminum tubing and 
is approximately 1.25 inches in diameter. 
the footpad. The probe-deployment mechanism (fig. C- 3) consists of two fittings 
connected by a pin joint. 
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Upper hinge fitting 
Figure C-3. - Lunar-surface-sensing- 
probe -deployment mechanism. 
Ball ock 7 Probe boom-, 
Visual indicator 1 
Spring 
with be1lov.s 
Figure C-4. - Lunar-surface-sensing- 
probe switch. 
Attached to the lower hinge fitting 
and to the locking link a r e  downlock indi- 
cator plates that a r e  painted a luminous 
green. When the probe is properly locked 
down, the plates form an unbroken 
straight line; otherwise, they show as a 
broken line. These visual indicators are 
the only positive means of determining 
that the probes are properly locked. 
The second major component of the 
probe is the sensing- switch subassembly. 
A diagram of the switch, including the 
mechanism that allows switch actuation 
from vertical, horizontal, o r  combined 
loads, is shown in figure C-4. This 
mechanism, which is housed within a 
container, allows switch actuation on a 
surface with a bearing strength as low as 
2 3 lb/in . Loading the mechanism moves 
a cam that actuates a plunger in the cen- 
te r  of the switch. A s  the plunger actuates, 
it moves a magnet that allows the contacts 
on two reed switches within the switch to 
open. When the switches open, the two 
lunar-contact lamps in the cabin a r e  illu- 
minated. The circuitry is redundant in 
that both of the reed switches within a 
single probe must open to produce a lunar- 
contact signal. This provides for the 
possibility of a switch failed in the open 
position. Further reliability is provided 
by the three probes, any one of which can 
activate the lunar- contac t circuitry. 
Therefore, if a switch fails closed in 
one probe, the second probe to contact the 
surface will cause a lunar-contact signal. 
When the switch is actuated, it latches in the open position, causing the lunar-contact 
light to remain illuminated even after failure of the boom structure beneath the descend- 
ing footpad. 
FOOTPAD 
2 The dish-shaped footpad, which was designed for a 1. 0-lb/in static-bearing- 
strength surface, is 37 inches in diameter and approximately 7 inches deep. The footpad 
is attached to the primary strut  by a ball-and-socket joint (fig. C-5). Before touchdown 
on the lunar surface, the footpad is restrained from moving by four restraint s t raps  
attached between the footpad hub and the primary-strut end fitting. At touchdown, these 
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Figure C-5. - Landing-gear footpad. 
s t raps  break, allowing the footpad to 
rotate as necessary during sliding. The 
s t raps  are designed to fail when a moment 
of 3340 in-lb is applied to rotate the pad. 
The footpad, constructed of aluminum 
honeycomb bonded to machined aluminum 
face sheets, has been designed to with- 
stand considerable damage from impact- 
ing rocks, craters ,  ledges, and so forth. 
The results of ground tests to determine 
the ability of the footpad to remain func- 
tional even after considerable impact 
damage a r e  discussed in the section of 
appendix B entitled " Footpad-Component 
Tests. " 
The type 7075 machined-aluminum 
face-sheet thickness ranges from a nom- 
inal 0.0085 to 0.0165 inch on the lower 
surface and from 0.0085 to 0.050 inch on 
the upper surface. The footpad core is 
constructed of type 2024 and type 5052 
honeycomb. 
PREFLIGHT CHECKOUT 
To ensure proper operation of the landing gear during flight, extensive ground 
checkout of the hardware is conducted at the factory and at the launch site (fig. C-6). 
Factory checkout ensures that the landing gear is operating properly and that any oper- 
ating deficiencies can be corrected before shipment. 
Kennedy Space Center provides a final check before installation of the LM and the LM 
adapter. 
Checkout at the NASA John F. 
Checkout requirements at the prime contractor facility and at the launch site 
a r e  similar and consist of mechanical and electrical checks. All landing-gear checkout 
is performed in an ambient environment that meets spacecraft cleanliness requirements. 
Electrical checks consist of testing the landing-gear downlock-switch and probe- switch 
circuitry. End-to-end circuitry tests a r e  made between the switches and the cabin 
indicators. Mechanical checks a r e  made of the landing-gear probe-deployment and 
downlock mechanism, the probe release mechanism, the landing-gear downlock 
switches, and the lunar -surface-sensing-probe switches. 
The lunar-surface- sensing-probe switches are subject to inadvertent activation 
and latching during vehicle checkout at the launch site. 
check of these switches is performed approximately 18 hours before launch, just before 
closeout of the SLA. 
forms a r e  removed from around the LM. 
practical after installation of the honeycomb cartridges ; however, such checks a r e  
performed during landing-gear assembly. 
For this reason, a final visual 
This is the final vehicle check performed before the work plat- 
Functional checks of the struts are not 
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Figure C-6.  - Landing-gear-assembly test flow. 
Because the landing gear is exercised considerably before the flight and because 
much work is performed in the vicinity of the landing gear during vehicle checkout, 
certain basic hazards have been identified with regard to the hardware. The item of 
greatest concern has been the possibility of misuse of landing-gear hardware inside the 
SLA where the working area is cramped. Several instances of inadvertent actuation of 
probe switches have occurred on vehicles being readied for launch. In addition, con- 
cern for misuse of landing-gear hardware, such as using s t ruts  for handholds o r  foot- 
holds, prompted a special training program fo r  personnel working inside the SLA to 
preclude any further incidents. 
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